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Ohio Condominium Law Reform:
A Comparative Critique
John D. Blackburn*
Nancy J. Melia**
Substantial amendments to the Ohio Condominium Property Act have recently
become effective. To improve consumer protection, the antendments impose written
disclosure requirements upon the developer, provide penaltiesfor noncompliance,
create certain warranties, and establish a timetablefor the developer to relinquish
control over the unit owners association. The amendments also regulate condomin-
ium conversions and expandable and leasehold condominiums. Comparing the re-
vised Ohio statute to other condominium legislation, the authors examine the scope
ofthe amended statute, review the recent changes, explore theirpossible applications,
and evaluate their impact on the rights and liabilities of individual unit owners.
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INTRODUCTION
MANY PEOPLE DESCRIBE the future of housing in the
United States in terms of clustered living communities where
people can enjoy certain amenities that will be too expensive for
the single homeowner. Even today apartment complexes offer
tennis courts, lawn care services, and swimming pools for a small
monthly charge incorporated into a rent payment. Americans
seem to prefer, however, to purchase their own residences, and
condominiums provide a method by which they can live in apart-
ment-type communities while building equity in their homes.'
The word condominium refers to a residential or office com-
plex in which individuals possess their own units in fee and own
an undivided interest in the common areas in proportion to their
share in the ownership of the entire project.2 Ohio statutorily
sanctioned the creation of condominiums in 1963 by enacting the
Condominium Property Act. The Act was passed in response to
the increasing cost and scarcity of land and, was a direct result of
a 1961 amendment to the National Housing Act which authorized
the Federal Housing Administration to insure condominium
mortgages. The 1963 Act addressed (1) the creation of a condo-
minium form of cooperative ownership,5 (2) the respective inter-
ests each unit owner possessed in the common areas,6 (3) the
1. The condominium is not an altogether new concept. The idea of owning an indi-
vidual unit dwelling in a multiunit housing structure dates back to the Romans and flour-
ished within the walled cities of Europe during the Middle Ages. Bucknall, Leasehold
Condominiums. The Further Right of the Fee, 14 OSGOOD HALL LU. 29 (1976).
2. Seikel, Condominium Property, 35 CLEV. BJ. 101 (1964).
3. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.01-.22 (Page 1970).
4. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715y (1976)).
5. OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.02, .06 (Page 1970). According to these sections,
chapter 5311 applies to a piece of property only if(l) the property is a fee simple estate or a
99-year leasehold estate and (2) the property owner files a declaration, drawings, and by-
laws with the county recorder and the county auditor.
6. Id. § 5311.04. Each unit owner has an undivided interest in the common areas
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condominium administration,7 (4) the rights of lienors, 8 and (5)
the removal of the property from the Act's provisions.9
The accelerating use of condominium ownership revealed
many deficiencies in Ohio's condominium legislation. For exam-
ple, the 1963 Act lacked any consumer protection provisions regu-
lating such areas of developer abuse as the nondisclosure of fees
and expenses, the misuse of purchaser deposits, and the practice of
converting apartment buildings into condominiums without in-
forming purchasers that they were buying older, used housing.
Like legislatures in other states,' 0 most notably those of Virginia 1
and Florida,'2 the Ohio General Assembly recognized the need
for modernization and improvement in its condominium statute
and recently enacted substantial amendments to the original
Act.'3 Effective October 1, 1978, the amended statute adds several
new dimensions to Ohio condominium law. For residential con-
dominiums the amendments enlarge the amount of information
required to be included in the declaration' 4 (the master document
which submits the property to the provisions of the statute), im-
pose additional disclosure requirements upon developers, 15 pro-
vide for certain warranties, 6 and establish a specific timetable for
the assumption of control of the unit owners association by own-
ers other than the developer.' 7 In addition to the consumer pro-
tection provisions for residential condominiums, the amended
statute authorizes expandable condominiums' 8- developments
which are constructed in phases to allow for test marketing of the
project and the use of proceeds from initial sales to finance future
and facilities in the proportion that the fair market value of his unit bears to the total value
of all the units. Such percentage may be altered only by the owners' unanimous approval
of an amendment to the declaration.
7. Id. §§ 5311.08, .19.
8. Id. §§ 5311.13, .18.
9. Id. § 5311.17. To effect removal all unit owners must vote affirmatively to remove
the property. Upon removal, the property becomes owned in common by the unit owners,
whose interest is the percentage of interest in the common areas previously owned.
10. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-67 to 90c (West 1978); GA. CODE ANN.
85-1601e to 1645e (1978); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 514A-1 to 70 (Supp. 1977); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1121-1142 (West Supp. 1978).
11. VA. CODE §§ 55-79.38 to .103 (Supp. 1978).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.101-.508 (West Supp. 1978).
13. Am. Sub. H.B. 404, 112th Cong., Reg. Sess. (1977-78) (codified at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5311.01-.09,.11, .13,_.18, .21-.27 (Page Supp. 1978)).
14. Id. § 5311.05(B)(6), .05(C), .05(D).
15. Id. § 5311.26.
16. Id. § 5311.25(E).
17. Id. § 5311.08(C), .08(D).
18. Id.§5311.01(Q),.01(R).
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development. Among other miscellaneous changes, the amended
statute regulates the conversion of apartment complexes into con-
dominium developments. 19 The purpose of this article is to re-
view the recent changes in Ohio condominium law and to explore
their possible applications. It examines the scope of the amended
statute and the restrictions placed on various developer practices,
and evaluates the impact on the rights and liabilities of unit own-
ers. The article concludes with an examination of two innovative
forms of condominium development permitted by the
Act-expandable and leasehold condominiums.
I. GENERAL SCOPE OF THE STATUTE
Innovation has expanded the usefulness of condominiums. As
a result, the condominium concept is being extended into new ar-
eas of application: shopping centers, industrial plants, agricultural
properties, cemeteries, mobile home parks, recreational centers,
camping areas, and fractional time-period ownerships.20 It is
clear that the legislature intended both the 1963 and the amended
statute to cover nonresidential condominiums. The legislature
adopted the term "unit" '2 to describe the basic component of con-
dominium ownership, instead of the term "apartment" as in other
statutes,22 and thus avoided the residential connotations of the lat-
ter term. Further, specific references to commercial facilities are
made throughout the statute.23
However, the definition of "unit" under the Ohio statute re-
mains quite narrow in scope and should be broadened to cover a
wider range of possible applications. As defined in section
5311.01 of the 1963 Act and left essentially unchanged by the re-
cent amendments, a condominium unit is a "part of the condo-
minium property consisting of one or more rooms on one or more
floors of a building ..... 24 Section 5311.03 establishes the
boundaries of a unit as the interior surfaces of its perimeter floors,
19. Id. §§ 5311.25(G), .26(G).
20. Note, Building on the Horizontal Property Act: Condominiums in Iowa, 59 IOWA L.
REv. 291,293 (1973); Comment, Mfssouri's Condominium PropertyAct: Timefora Change,
42 Mo. L. REv. 271, 271-72 (1977).
21. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.01(G) (Page 1970); id. § 5311.01(I) (Page Supp.
1978).
22. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKiN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.01, at 5-1
(1973).
23. Eg., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.01(B)(1)(f) (Page 1970); id. 5311.05 (B)(3)
(Page Supp. 1978).
24. Id § 5311.01(G) (Page 1970); id § 5311.01(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
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ceilings, and walls, including windows and doors.25 The Ohio At-
torney General has further restricted the possible utilization of the
condominium concept by noting that "units" are generally under-
stood to consist of "interior walls and air space" 26 and are "de-
fined restrictively as 'rooms.' "27 He also ruled that property
cannot qualify as a condominium when it consists of a group of
lots intended for the private, exclusive ownership of some project
owners and when common areas consist primarily of roads and
similar types of commonly used property.28 The retained narrow
definition of a unit will make it difficult to use the condominium
concept in more innovative areas.
Illustrative of some approaches which encourage a less restric-
tive application of the condominium concept are those taken by
Utah and Florida. Utah's legislation not only specifically covers
commercial and industrial condominiums but also defines a unit
as a "separate physical part of the property intended for any type
of independent use."2 9 Florida similarly provides latitude for in-
novative use of the condominium concept simply by defining a
unit as a "part of the condominium property which is subject to
exclusive ownership."3 These definitions allow developers to ex-
periment with the condominium concept in a wide variety of situ-
ations, unhampered by the restrictions of the terms "room" and
"building."
It is also uncertain under the Ohio Act whether the statute ap-
plies to residential condominiums where units are rented out to
vacationers during a good portion of the year by unit owners or
the unit owners association.3" Such a situation may be covered by
the Ohio Securities Act.3 2 If the purchaser of a condominium unit
shares in the gross proceeds or net profits of an enterprise man-
aged by the seller, then the interests of the purchaser will consti-
tute investment contracts. If, however, the purchaser occupies the
unit and conducts the enterprise, then the interest is not a secur-
25. Id. § 5311.03(D) (Page 1970).
26. 71-031 OP. OHIO ATr'Y GEN. 2-100 (1971).
27. Id. at 2-101.
28. Id. at 2-98.
29. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-3(2), -3(7) (Supp. 1977).
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.103(16) (West Supp. 1978).
31. See generally Roney & Rohan, Resort Condominiums: The Housing Industry's
Prescrition for Relaxation, Retirement, and Real Estate Investment, 2 CONN. L. REv. 50
(1969).
32. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707 (Page Supp. 1977).
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ity.33 Thus, if a buyer does not live in the unit or lives in it only
for a short time and participates in some type of pooling arrange-
ment whereby the developer rents out the units and then distrib-
utes the proceeds or profits to the unit owners, the developer may
be subject to the securities law.
A similar concept, fractional time-period ownership, in which
different buyers own the unit for a part of a year, also has not been
specifically addressed by the Ohio legislature. Section 5311.01 of
the amended statute, however, changed the definition of "unit
owner" from "a person or persons" to "a person. ' 34 The change
casts doubt on the legality of fractional time ownership. Utah spe-
cifically permits time-period units, 35 and there seems to be no per-
suasive reason why the Ohio statute should exclude this form of
ownership.
The new provisions sanctioning expandable development3 6
and the division and combination of units37 add new flexibility for
developers wishing to construct commercial and industrial con-
dominiums.38  Ohio, like Florida39 and Georgia,' applies its dis-
closure and consumer protection sections to residential
condominiums only.4" This is presumably because the commercial
or industrial buyer will have more expertise in dealing with the
developer and thus need less protection. To what extent this is
true, especially in the lesser known areas of condominium appli-
cation, deserves careful examination. If developers take advan-
33. In State v. Silberburg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956), the owner of an
improved real estate project made up of multiple residence units sold undivided but specifi-
cally designated units to purchasers for their personal use. There was a provision in each
contract of sale for title to the entire project to be taken in the name of a corporation, in
which the unit owner was to have stock according to the value of his ownership in the
project, and another for the cooperative management of the project. The court held that
the contracts were for the sale of real estate and were not securities under the Ohio Securi-
ties Act.
34. OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5311.01(J) (Page Supp. 1978).
35. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-3(20) (Supp. 1977).
36. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.01(R), .05(C) (Page Supp. 1978). See notes
446-78 infra and accompanying text.
37. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.03(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
38. The Ohio statutory scheme could become even more flexible if future amendments
would (1) permit conversion of common areas to limited common areas, (2) provide for
convertible space, and (3) provide for contractible condominiums. See Comment, The
Georgia Condominium Act of1975: A Sound Easisfor Innovative Condominium Practice, 24
EMORY L.J. 891, 900-05 (1975). See notes 474-77 infra and accompanying text.
39. FLA. STAT. At. §§ 718.502, .504 (West Supp. 1978). Section 718.103(18) of this
statute specifically defines residential condominium.
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1643e(a) (1978).
41. OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.24-.26 (Page Supp. 1978).
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tage of these nonresidential buyers, protection now afforded
residential buyers should be extended to them.42
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. Restrictions on Developer Marketing Practices
1. Presale Disclosure
Like a prospective purchaser of any product, the prospective
purchaser of a condominium is subjected to advertising and pro-
motion. The buyer learns that he is entitled not only to the same
tax benefits, equity, and ownership as a single family homeowner,
but also to recreational amenities and maintenance services not
available to most single home purchasers. He rarely learns, how-
ever, that in many instances he has heard only half the story and
none of the possible drawbacks.
To bolster sales the developer or his agent may gloss over or
misinform the purchaser about negative factors quite relevant to
his decision whether to buy. For example, developers may under-
estimate monthly maintenance charges and costs, omit mention of
the likelihood of increases,43 or fail to itemize the charges and
costs.4" Thus, the buyer may not know whether expenses are com-
mon or individual45 or whether a sweetheart contract is hidden in
the monthly charge.' Not only may excessive charges be imposed
on unit owners who transfer or lease47 their units, but they also
may be forced to contribute for improvements. 48
In addition, the typical prospective purchaser is unsophistica-
ted in condominium law and consequently unaware of the poten-
tial for developer abuse. For example, the developer may use the
purchaser's deposit to finance construction of other units49 or he
may exempt himself, as owner of the unsold units, from those
42. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1140 (West Supp. 1978) (no distinction between
residential and nonresidential units).
43. Note, Full Disclosure to Massachusetts Condominium Buyers: A Proposed Statute,
10 NEW ENG. L. REv. 325, 327 (1974); Comment, Condominium Regulation Beyond
Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 639, 642 n.19 (1975).
44. Comment, supra note 43, at 642 n.19.
45. Rohan, Condominiums and the Consumer: A Checklist for Counseling the Unit
Purchaser, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 1028, 1060 (1974).
46. Comment, supra note 38, at 895; Comment, supra note 43, at 644-45. For a dis-
cussion of sweetheart contracts, see notes 231-48 infra and accompanying text.
47. Comment, Legal Protectionfor Florida Condominium and Cooperative Buyers and
Owners, 27 U. MiAMi L. REV. 451, 462 (1973).
48. Legislative Symposium, Condominiums, 35 LA. L. REv. 653, 657 (1975).
49. Comment, supra note 38, at 906 n.100; Comment, supra note 43, at 643-44.
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units' share of the common expenses5" while still reserving the
right to rent the unsold units.51 The developer may possibly re-
serve the right to amend unilaterally the declaration or bylaws,52
alter the projected layout,53 cancel the offering if an insufficient
number of purchase commitments are obtained,54 or retain ex-
tended control of the unit owners association.5
Thus, the prospective purchaser may be both misled and unin-
formed about the nature of the interest that he is buy-
ing-ordinarily the single most expensive purchase a consumer
makes. 6 Finally, because condominium instruments are lengthy
and complex, the purchaser may often find it difficult to ascertain
his rights and remedies under the declaration and bylaws5 7and
may be unaware of any legal rights he may have. Since currently
available nonstatutory remedies provide inadequate protection for
the prospective purchaser,58 the recent amendments add extensive
50. Comment, rupra note 38, at 895; Comment, supra note 43, at 646.
51. Note, supra note 43, at 327.
52. Note, Real Property: Oklahoma Condominiums-Prevention ofAbuse, 28 OKLA. L.
REV. 189, 191 (1975).
53. 1 P. RoHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 22, § 13.02[3], at 13-10.1.
54. Id.
55. Rohan, supra note 45, at 1037.
56. Id. at 1034.
57. THE NATIONAL ASSOC. OF ATToRNEYs GENERAL, LAND AND CONDOMINIUM
SALES REGULATION 4 (1975).
58. The original Ohio Condominium Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.01-.22
(Page 1970), was an enabling statute with no consumer protection provisions. However,
under Ohio common law, purchasers who are able to prove deceit and misrepresentation
can seek relief from a developer. To prove deceit, the buyer must demonstrate: (1) that
there was a representation as to existing or past fact, material to the transaction; (2) that the
representation was false at the time it was made; (3) that it was made in bad faith with the
knowledge it was false; (4) that it was made with the intent of misleading the other party
into relying upon it; (5) that the buyer relied on the misrepresentation, with a right to so
rely; (6) and that injury occurred. See, eg., Lucke v. Robinson, 56 Ohio App. 242, 10
N.E.2d 283 (6th Dist. 1937). The Ohio common law action is a difficult burden for condo-
minium purchasers. A failure to disclose information may or may not constitute fraud.
Courts distinguish between concealment, which implies an intent to injure, and simple fail-
ure to disclose. See, eg., Talcott v. Henderson, 31 Ohio SL 162 (1877). Courts require a
duty to speak, as well as an intention to deceive as to a material fact, and the buyer-seller
relationship does not alone give rise to such a duty. See, e.g., Schubert v. Neyer, 12 Ohio
Op. 2d 231, 165 N.E.2d 226 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959). In addition, courts generally still
apply the rule of caveat emptor in the sale of real estate. See, ag., Traverse v. Long, 165
Ohio St. 249, 135 N.E.2d 256 (1956).
The only exception applies when there is a material defect of a dangerous nature. If the
defect was known to the seller and unknown to the buyer, or if the buyer could not have
discovered the defect upon reasonable observation, then the courts may find a duty in the
seller. See, eg., Klott v. Associates Real Estate, 41 Ohio App. 2d 118,322 N.E.2d 690 (10th
Dist. 1974). However, buyers are under a duty to inspect the premises, and no fraud will be
found as to conditions which are discoverable and open to observation. See, e.g., Traverse
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consumer disclosure requirements. In so doing, Ohio has joined
the growing number of states mandating some form of pre-sale
protection to the purchaser of a residential condominium.59
The new amendments require disclosure of information in the
declaration and in a written offering statement which must be fur-
nished to all prospective and actual purchasers.6" Section 5311.25
provides that a developer or his agent may not offer to sell or sell a
condominium ownership interest unless the condominium instru-
ments provide detailed information concerning the rights of both
purchaser and developer. 1 The statute fails, however, to require
that the developer actually furnish copies of the instruments to the
v. Long, 165 Ohio St. at 252, 135 N.E.2d at 259. One court has held that even if the subject
matter is inaccessible, the buyer has no right to rely on the seller's representationr. See,
e.g., Schubert v. Neyer, 12 Ohio Op.2d at 235, 165 N.E.2d at 231. A common pleas court
has adopted a contrary view and imposed an absolute duty of complete disclosure on sell-
ers as to anything not visible. See, e.g., Gilbey v. Cooper, 37 Ohio Misc. 119, 310 N.E.2d
268 (C.P. Columbiana County 1973).
The common law remedy may prove inadequate for condominum purchasers. Where
the buyer can prove deceit, he has an election of remedies. He may affirm the transaction
and sue in tort for damages for fraud and deceit. See, e.g., Frederickson v. Nye, 110 Ohio
St., 459, 144 N.E. 299 (1924). If the buyer can show malicious intent, he may recover
exemplary damages, but not otherwise. See, e.g., Waters v. Novak, 94 Ohio App. 347, 115
N.E.2d 420 (9th Dist. 1953); Crum v. McCoy, 41 Ohio Misc. 34, 322 N.E.2d 161 (Franklin
County Mun. Ct. 1974). In the alternative, the buyer may rescind the contract, recover
money paid, and have any other consistent remedial relief. See, e.g., Frederickson v. Nye,
110 Ohio St. at 467, 144 N.E.2d at 301. The period of the statute of limitations does not
begin until the discovery of the fraud. See, e.g., Christ v. Dice, 18 Ohio St. 536 (1869). The
right to recover may be barred by waiver of laches if the transaction is not rescinded
promptly upon discovery of the fraud. See, e.g., Meyers v. Hoops, 12 Ohio Op. 2d 481, 140
N.E.2d 65 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Kaufman v. Cornell, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 670 (9th Dist. Ct.
App. 1929).
59. Other states take different approaches to the consumer protection issue. Besides
the "pure" disclosure approach taken by states such as Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
§ 322 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975), and Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-71b (West
1978), other states require important provisions to be flagged or set out in bold face type.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.504 (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1643e(c),
-1643e(e), -1643e(g), -1643e(h) (1978). Other states maintain a regulatory agency in addi-
tion to requiring disclosure. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11018 (West Supp. 1978); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 718.504-.510 (West Supp. 1978); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 514A-31 to 70 (Supp.
1977); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs LAW § 339-ee (McKinney Supp. 1977); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 352-e (McKinney Supp. 1977).
60. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.06(B), .26 (Page Supp. 1978). Section 5311.01(0)
defines "purchaser" to include both actual and prospective purchasers of condominium
ownership interests. However, the statute uses both "purchaser" and "prospective pur-
chaser." For example, § 5311.25(A) refers to a purchaser's deposit, § 5311.26(J) refers to
the rights of purchasers, yet § 5311.26 requires disclosure to a prospective purchaser.
61. Section 5311.25 requires that the following appear in the condominium instru-
ments:
(1) The legal rights of the buyer and developer regarding use of the buyer's deposit
or downpayment;
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purchaser and exacts only that the developer inform the purchaser
of his right to review them.62
The major disclosure provision of the new Act requires the de-
veloper to provide each prospective purchaser with a readable and
understandable written statement that discloses fully and accu-
rately all material circumstances affecting the development.63 An
(2) The extent to which the law permits the developer to retain control of either the
unit owners association or a property interest in the condominium development;
(3) The unit owners' rights regarding management contracts entered into prior to
their assumption of control of the association;
(4) A description of the warranties given in the transaction and when they begin and
end;
(5) A notification that the developer will have the rights of a unit owner with respect
to unsold units;
(6) A statement that all tenants in a conversion condominium were given the requi-
site notice; and,
(7) A limitation that the deposits and downpayments shall not be subject to attach-
ment by creditors of a developer or a purchaser.
Id § 5311.25.
62. Id § 5311.26(J). See note 63 infra.
63. The written statement to the purchaser must include the following information:
(1) The name and address of the development and the developer,
(2) A general description of the development including the types of units, prices, and
total number possible through expansion or merger,
(3) A general disclosure of the status of construction, zoning, and other approvals
and compliance or noncompliance with statutes and regulations, and the actual or sched-
uled dates of completion;
(4) The significant terms of any financing offered by or through the developer,
(5) A description of warranties for structural elements and mechanical and other
systems, stated separately for units and common areas and facilities;
(6) A two-year projection, to be updated every six months, of annual expenditures
per unit for the common areas including the formula for determining each unit's share, the
amount of tax, insurance, operating and maintenance expenses, the monthly cost of utili-
ties, and any others costs and fees reasonably ascertainable by the developer;,
(7) A special report as to conversion condominiums;
(8) Significant condominium management provisions including conditions for form-
ing a unit owners association, the apportionment of voting rights, the contractual rights and
responsibilities of the association, a statement that the condominium instruments are bind-
ing legal documents, and the method for amending them by the association;
(9) A facsimile of any management contract and a statement of its effect and any
relationship between the developer and managing agent;
(10) A statement in 20-point, boldface type of the purchaser's right to review the
condominium instruments and to void the contract, any conditions for the return of de-
posit, and rights to take legal action;
(11) The existence or requirement of a reserve fund to finance repairs or replacement
of the common areas and facilities;
(12) The significant terms of any title encumbrances affecting the development;
(13) A statement of the requirement for escrow of deposits;
(14) A statement of any restraints on the free alienability of the development; and,
(15) A statement describing any present litigation concerning the condominium devel-
opment.
Id § 5311.26.
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intentional omission or misstatement of a material fact is a viola-
tion of the statute.64 A purchaser who discovers that his purchase
agreement is in violation of the disclosure provisions has a right to
rescind. This right must be exercised within fifteen days from the
date of the execution of the agreement or receipt of the written
statement, whichever is later. Upon a purchaser's exercise of his
right, the developer must refund monies paid by the buyer and
pay all closing costs. This remedy is in addition to any other
available remedy. The purchaser may also obtain damages and
collect no less than five hundred dollars for each violation plus
attorneys' fees and costs. However, if the purchaser brings an ac-
tion he knew to be groundless or in bad faith and the developer
prevails, the court may require the purchaser to pay the devel-
oper's attorneys' fees.65
In addition to private remedies, section 5311.27 provides also
for public enforcement. The Ohio Attorney General is empow-
ered (1) to bring an action to obtain a declaratory judgment that
an act or practice of a developer is violative of the Code, (2) to
pray for an injunction to prevent a threatened action, (3) to insti-
tute a class action for damages on behalf of persons injured by a
violation, and (4) to request the court to appoint a receiver or
master.66 The prerequisite for such action is that the Attorney
General have reason to believe that substantial numbers of citi-
zens are being affected, that substantial harm is occurring, or that
enforcement will be serving a substantial public interest.67 The
statute of limitations for the Attorney General's action is two
years after the occurrence of the violation. In addition, the Attor-
ney General may, with court approval, enter into a consent judg-
ment with the developer. The consent judgment, however, cannot
64. Id. Except for a two-year statute applicable to the Attorney General's remedy, see
notes 66-68 infra and accompanying text, no statute of limitations is provided for in
§ 5311.27. If the general statute of limitations, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.14 (Page
Supp. 1977), applies, it is not clear whether the statute begins to run from the occurrence of
the violation or from its discovery. Section 2305.14 merely states that the cause of action be
brought within 10 years "after the cause thereof accrued." Id
65. Id. § 5311.27(B)(3) (Page Supp. 1978).
66. Id. § 5311.27.
67. The public remedies supplement the purely private remedies. It is noteworthy that
the legislature saw fit to provide public remedies without first requiring the filing of a com-
plaint or the resort to a state agency lacking enforcement powers. For examples of recent
legislation requiring notification of a government agency, see Consumer Sales Practices
Act, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.06, .07 (Page Supp. 1977); Civil Rights Commission
Act, id. §§ 4112.05, .10 (Page 1973).
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be used as evidence of a prior violation.6"
The objective of disclosure "is to provide the prospective pur-
chaser with understandable information concerning problem ar-
eas which past experience has shown are likely to escape
consideration by the purchaser. . ... "9 The underlying assump-
tions are that disclosure requirements will force developers to pro-
ceed more carefully in planning and selling units and that buyers
will be able to make an informed70 decision before entering into a
purchase.7 1 These important objectives, however, may be stunted
by the length and complexity of the disclosure statement.72 The
burdens of protection and enforcement remain on the buyer, who
must hire an attorney to evaluate the statement in order to decide
if the condominium terms are fair. The buyer must also bear the
initial costs of suit.73 For these reasons, the utility of the pure dis-
closure approach has been questioned, particularly as the sole
method of protecting the consumer.74 The developer may inform
the buyer fully and accurately without any materially misleading
statements or omissions.7" Yet the unsophisticated purchaser may
know little more about the condominium than he did prior to
reading the statement.76
Some obfuscation may continue under the amendments.
While section 5311.26 requires that the developer furnish the pro-
spective purchaser with a full, accurate, readable, and understand-
able written statement alerting him to his right to review the
condominium instruments, 77 the section does not require that the
instruments be readable and understandable. 7  This anomaly
68. Presumably the consent judgment could not be used by a private party as a prima
facie violation.
69. Comment, supra note 38, at 908.
70. Comment, To Tellthe Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing But the Truth-Helpfor
Florida's Frazzled Condominium Buyers?, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 396 (1975).
71. Note, New York Regulation of Condominiums, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 964, 965
(1974).
72. See Comment, supra note 70, at 396-97.
73. Comment, supra note 20, at 282; Comment, supra note 70, at 397.
74. See, eg., Comment, supra note 43, at 667-68. The effectiveness of the disclosure
approach has been questioned in the securities field where generally investors are fairly
sophisticated. Id. at 666-68. In the condominium area, where many buyers may be of
middle- or lower-income, id. at 639-68, the effectiveness of disclosure becomes even more
doubtful. Id. at 667.
75. This is required by OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26 (Page Supp. 1978).
76. Comment, supra note 43, at 668.
77. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(J) (Page Supp. 1978). See notes 62-63 supra
and accompanying text.
78. Presumably to obviate much of this problem, § 5311.26 provides that the written
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makes possible a situation in which the purchaser, exercising his
right to review the instruments, is apprised of his rights in a form
that may be unintelligible to him. Several states have enhanced
consumer protection by adopting some form of regulation. 79 Flor-
ida, apparently dissatisfied with the consumer protection offered
by its pure disclosure statute, recently provided for presale regula-
tion of condominium sales through the Department of Business
Regulation."° However, unlike Florida and other states, Ohio has
not been the victim of widespread developer abuses.8 ' Experience
may demonstrate that the additional requirements, in conjunction
with the amendments' other substantive provisions, will afford the
Ohio condominium purchaser sufficient protection.
Without resorting to regulation, Ohio could enhance consumer
protection by simply requiring that certain information be more
conspicuously displayed on the written statement. Florida, for ex-
ample, requires that the first page of the purchase contract inform
the buyer of the documents which the developer must give him
and also that the first page of the prospectus alert the buyer to the
importance of information inside.8 1 Within the prospectus, provi-
statement be "readable and understandable." Such a standard is so vague as to be unwork-
able and in this statute appears to be rendered nugatory by the imposition of liability for
only intentionally misleading material statements and omissions. For a discussion of lia-
bility, see notes 89-91 infra and accompanying text.
79. See HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 514A-31 to 50 (Supp. 1977); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 559.24 (West Supp. 1978); id. § 559.26 (West 1967); VA. CODE §§ 55-79.86 to .93, .99 to
.101 (Supp. 1978).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.501 (West Supp. 1978).
81. See generally Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities Law
Implications Create a Needfor a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 350 (1973);
Comment, supra note 47, at 451.
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503(1) (West Supp. 1978). The following caveat must ap-
pear conspicuously on the first page of the contract: "ORAL REPRESENTATIONS CAN-
NOT BE RELIED UPON AS CORRECTLY STATING THE REPRESENTATIONS
OF THE DEVELOPER. FOR CORRECT REPRESENTATIONS, REFERENCE
SHOULD BE MADE TO THIS CONTRACT AND THE DOCUMENTS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 718.503, FLORIDA STATUTES, TO BE FURNISHED BY A DEVEL-
OPER TO A BUYER OR LESSEE."
Id. Section 718.504(l) requires that the front cover of the first page must contain only the
name of the condominium and the following statements in conspicuous type:
1. THIS PROSPECTUS (OFFERING CIRCULAR) CONTAINS IMPORTANT
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED IN ACQUIRING A CONDOMINIUM UNIT.
2. THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED HEREIN ARE ONLY SUMMARY IN NA-
TURE. A PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER SHOULD REFER TO ALL REFERENCES,
ALL EXHIBITS HERETO, THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS, AND SALES MATER-
IALS.
3. ORAL REPRESENTATIONS CANNOT BE RELIED UPON AS CORRECTLY
STATING THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE DEVELOPER. REFER TO THIS
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sions guarding against potential developer abuse must be set out
in conspicuous type. 3 To further inform the Ohio condominium
purchaser and to alert him to factors weighing against a decision
to purchase, Ohio law should provide that the notification of buy-
ers' rights 4 appear either on the front page of the written state-
ment or near the purchaser's signature.8 5 Placing that provision in
either location would emphasize the need to review attendant doc-
uments, alert the buyer to their importance, and inform him of his
right to rescind the purchase contract before his fifteen days ex-
pire. As an added protection the first page of the written state-
ment should warn that the condominium instruments and the
written statement involve complex legal rights and that a full un-
derstanding requires legal consultation. 6 Finally, the information
contained in the condominium instruments, to the extent that it is
not duplicative, should be provided to the prospective purchaser
in the written statement.8 7 This would be consistent with the dis-
closure philosophy and would amplify the information available
to potential consumers about their rights concerning deposits,
management contracts, and developer control of the association. 8
PROSPECTUS (OFFERING CIRCULAR) AND ITS EXHIBITS FOR CORRECT
REPRESENTATIONS.
Id. at § 718.504(l).
83. The provisions relate to recreational facilities leases, id. § 718.504 (8); units trans-
ferred subject to a lease, id. § 718.504(10); management contracts, id. § 718.504(11); devel-
oper control of the association, id. § 718.504(12); and restrictions on the sale, lease, or
transfer of units, Id § 718.504(13).
84. Section 5311.26(J) requires that the written offering statement contain "a state-
ment in twenty-point, boldface type of the purchaser's right to review the condominim
instruments, to void the contract, any conditions to the return of any deposit, and a state-
ment of the rights of purchasers .. " OHio RBv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(J) (Page Supp.
1978). See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
85. The Ohio Home Solicitation Sale Act, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.23 (Page
Supp. 1977), contains the following provisions:
(B) In connection with every home solicitation sale:
(1) The following statement shall appear clearly and conspicuously on the copy
of the contract left with the buyer in boldface type of the minimum size of ten
points, in substantially the following form and in immediate proximity to the
space reserved in the contract for the signature of the buyer "You, the buyer, may
cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of the third business day
after the date of this transaction. See the attached notice of cancellation for an
explanation of this right."
86. Where, as in Ohio, developer practices have not been particularly abusive, a con-
dominium consumer protection statute strikes a good balance between the needs of the
parties by alerting the purchaser to certain information but placing the onus on him to seek
expert counselling to determine its impact.
87. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
88. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(A)-.25(D), .25(G) (Page Supp. 1978). See
also note 61 su.pra and accompanying text.
There are several other areas of consumer protection which should have been addressed
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The standard of liability to be applied for violation of the pres-
ent disclosure provisions is unclear.8 9 Section 5311.26 is essen-
tially an antifraud provision placing on the developer several
affirmative duties of disclosure9° and prescribing that the written
statement "shall not intentionally omit any material fact or con-
tain any untrue statement of a material fact . . ... 9' Thus the
by the amendments. First, neither § 5311.25 nor § 5311.26 is applicable to resale by the
purchaser. Compare. VA. CODE § 55-79.97 (Supp. 1978) (requiring unit owners to make
certain disclosures to subsequent purchasers on resale). The subsequent purchaser may
need to know information concerning the initial purchase (e.g., management contracts,
maintenance costs projection, warranty coverage), particularly where the developer still
retains some control over the condominium development. As a practical matter the pur-
chaser may be unable to sell his unit until the developer sells his because the developer
often is able to offer more attractive financing. Second, the statute omits the disclosure
requirement and does not impose liability for some well recognized areas of developer
abuse. For example, no liability exists under the statute for publishing false and mislead-
ing advertising and promotional materials. Contra, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.506(l) (West
Supp. 1978). Third, the statute does not impose liability for oral misstatements. Compare
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.503(l)(b), .503(3), .504(1) (West Supp. 1978) (requiring that pur-
chaser be told that he cannot rely on oral representations). Finally, the statute apparently
permits the developer to lease the recreational facilities to the unit owners, but it does not
require this fact to be disclosed in the written statement.
89. Condominium disclosure laws are patterned after the Securities Act of 1933, § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(j)(b) (1976). Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act grants a cause of action to the
purchaser of a security if any part of the registration statement "contained an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. ... Section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device" in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities and deems it unlawful for any person "to
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading. ... 17 C.F.R. § 204.10b-5 (1977).
90. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(A)-.26(O) (Page Supp. 1978). See notes 63-64
supra and accompanying text.
91. It is also unclear what is meant by the word "intentionally." Several other states
making the developer liable for materially false or misleading statements or omissions do
not require that the developer do so intentionally. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.506(1)
(West Supp. 1978) (the developer is liable for any published, material, false, or misleading
statement upon which the purchaser reasonably relied). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-90a(a) (West 1978) (developer is liable unless the declarant "did not know and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission. ... );
HAw. REv. STAT. § 514-68 (Supp. 1977) (no person "may knowingly authorize, direct or
aid in the publication.., of any false statement or representation.., and no person may
issue... any advertisement, pamphlet, prospectus, or letter. .. which contains any writ-
ten statement that is false. ... ). Construing this as an antifraud statute effectively ne-
gates the "readable and understandable" requirement except in the event that a failure to
make the written statement "readable" results in a material misstatement or omission. It is
also possible to read the section as requiring the statement to be both intelligible and not
materially misleading. Such a construction would not be redundant since an honest state-
ment can be presented in an incomprehensible manner and a dishonest one in a compre-
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developer may not be liable for negligent misstatement or omis-
sion of the information required in the written statement. Section
5311.25, on the other hand, seems to impose absolute liability
upon the developer.92 This distinction has some rational basis.
Section 5311.25 details the information that the condominium in-
struments must contain. Compliance requires no exercise of dis-
cretion on the developer's part. Section 5311.26, however, calls
for a great deal of judgment on the part of the developer. For
example, he must determine significant financing terms, date of
completion, maintenance expense projections, and significant
management provisions.93 Absolute liability in such an instance
would deter not only deceptive presale marketing practices but
condominium construction as well.
The private damage remedies provided by section 5311.27 are
quite harsh.94 A purchaser may bring a suit against a developer or
agent who sells a condominium ownership interest in violation of
the statute's disclosure provisions.95 Although the term "pur-
chaser" is defined in the statute to include a "prospective pur-
chaser," the section's requirement that the developer actually have
sold the interest to the purchaser indicates that these private reme-
dies are not available to a prospective purchaser.9 6 Conversely,
the "purchaser" who actually enters into a contract of sale and
pays the purchase price may receive a windfall. The statute does
not specifically require the purchaser to prove actual loss or to
elect between rescission and damages.97 Arguably, the purchaser
hensible manner. However, even assuming a court were to apply a reasonably prudent
man test to determine what is "readable and understandable," it is doubtful that the legis-
lature intended that the developer should pay at least $500 to every purchaser receiving the
written statement whether that purchaser incurred an actual loss or not.
92. OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25 (Page Supp. 1978) ("No developer or agent,
directly or indirectly, shall sell or offer to sell a condominium ownership interest in a con-
dominium development unless the condominium instruments pertaining to the develop-
ment provide" the information set out in note 61 supra.).
93. Id. § 5311.26(C), .26(D), .26(F), .26(H).
94. See id. § 5311.27(B). The damage remedy under § 5311.27(B)(l)-.27(B)(3) pro-
vides for a compensatory measure of damages to be computed by taking the difference
between the amount paid for the interest and the least of (1) the fair market value of the
interest as of the time the suit is brought, (2) the price at which the interest is disposed of
before suit in a bona fide market transaction, or (3) the price at which the unit is disposed
of after suit in a bona fide market transaction before judgment. Section 5311.27(B)(3) also
provides for a mandatory measure of damages of $500 for each violation against each
purchaser regardless of loss or reliance.
95. Id.
96. Id. ("Any developer or agent who sells a condominium ownership interest in vio-
lation .... (emphasis added)).
97. Id.
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may rescind the contract, obtain restitution of amounts paid .to the
developer, require the developer to pay all closing costs, and ap-
parently still obtain the minimum five hundred dollars for each
violation, court costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees.98 Section
5311.27(A) provides that the remedy of rescission be in addition to
any other remedy.99 This could be read to imply that both com-
mon law and statutory remedies provided by other legislation re-
main available as well as the remedies provided by section
5311.27(B). Therefore, even assuming that 5311.27(B) requires
the purchaser to have paid the purchase price, the purchaser may
rescind his contract after doing so as long as the fifteen days have
not expired."°° It seems more likely, however, that 5311.27(B) is
intended as a damage remedy when rescission is not exercised.
Subsection (B)(3) of section 5311.27 further provides that the
amount recoverable under this division cannot be less than five
hundred dollars for each violation. The use of the word "divi-
sion" rather than "section" indicates that the legislature intended
that this provision apply only to actions brought under subdivi-
sion (B) of section 5311.27. If subsection (B) is construed as a
remedy only for the nonrescinding purchaser, the statute is more
consistent with the usual compensatory civil remedies. However,
if the legislature had intended election of remedies, it should have
so provided to avoid the statute's present ambiguity. Section
5311.27(B) still permits recovery of five hundred dollars for each
violation even if the purchaser cannot prove a loss.101 Since this
98. It is possible for a court to analogize §§ 5311.26 and 5311.27 to their common law
counterparts. Thus a court could allow rescission for innocent misrepresentation, require
election of remedies, and provide the full measure of remedies available under common
law fraud. In a recent action under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1345 (Page Supp. 1977), an Ohio court refused to do so. Brown v. Bredenbeck, 2
Ohio Op. 3d 286, 287 (C.P. Franklin County 1975).
99. Common law fraud would permit rescission and run the statute of limitations
from the discovery of the fraud. See note 58 supra. Though this statute increases the
number of violations for which rescission is possible, it sharply limits the time for rescission
to 15 days whether the violation has been discovered by that time or not. However, if the
purchasers can prove common law fraud, then rescission, in addition to other remedies,
would presumably be available on that basis.
100. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.27(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
101. A violation of § 5311.25 would appear to impose liability for the failure to place
the requisite information in the condominium instruments rather than for the failure to
perform any substantive obligation (as required for a violation of § 5311.23). If, for exam-
ple, a warranty is breached by the developer, the appropriate action would be for breach of
warranty rather than for the remedy under § 5311.27. Thus a developer may neglect to
include in the legend that deposits and downpayments held in escrow are not subject to
attachment by creditors of the developer or a purchaser. If he sells units to 300 people who
cannot demonstrate loss due to the absence of this information from the condominium
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remedy may be imposed for each violation of section 5311.25 or
5311.26 by each suing purchaser, irrespective of actual loss, the
amount of damages for which the developer is liable could well be
disproportionate to the harm caused.
One particularly troublesome area in section 5311.27 is that
dealing with the right of the prevailing developer or agent to re-
cover attorneys' fees from a purchaser who brought an action
knowing it to be "groundless or in bad faith."10 The chilling ef-
fect of this provision on potential lawsuits in which the nature of
the violation is not firmly established is compounded further by
the use of the disjunctive. Reasonable statutory construction
would seem to imply that where the purchaser had adequate
grounds for suit, his motive should be irrelevant since the purpose
of the provision is to deter frivolous suits.
2. Conversions from Apartment Buildings
As the cost of construction rises the cost of building new con-
dominiums is becoming prohibitive. However, the increased con-
instruments and if all these purchasers sue, the developer will eventually be liable for
$150,000 in attorneys' fees plus costs for that error.
The present statutory scheme may also present a hardship to the purchaser. For exam-
ple, assume that the developer omits the required warranty provision from the condomin-
ium instruments and that the buyer suffers some loss ordinarily covered by warranty. If the
buyer's loss is greater than $500, he is met with the obstacle of proving a causal connection
between failure to include the provision and the loss he suffered. Under traditional theo-
ries of law, his loss resulted from a defect in materials or workmanship rather than from
the failure to include provisions in the instruments. Possibly the statute would permit the
purchaser to show a loss suffered as the result of not having warranty theory available as a
basis of recovery. In that event his loss would be measured by the damages he would have
received under traditional theories, such as negligence and breach of duty to construct in
workmanlike manner. Such a reading would certainly introduce a novel measure of dam-
ages into Ohio law. Courts may, however, be reluctant to embrace this novelty. To eradi-
cate such interpretive difficulties a better approach would be for the legislature to enact a
statutory warranty of merchantability in the sale of a condominium and to prohibit its
disclaimer. Such an approach would not put the onus on the developer to provide the
warranty and would be supported by analogous case law available for interpretation of the
provisions. See Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185
(1966). Florida law provides that the developer will be deemed to have granted to the
purchaser an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability. However, the plaintiff must
still prove causation and damage or injury. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.203 (West Supp. 1978).
102. This statutory remedy is somewhat analogous to the common law action for mali-
cious prosecution. See, eg., Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 155 N.E.2d 904 (1959);
Pope v. Pollock, 46 Ohio St. 367, 21 N.E. 356 (1889); Barnes v. Continental Acceptance
Corp., 4 Ohio Op. 3d 232 (8th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Avco Delta Corp. v. Walker, 22 Ohio
App. 2d 61, 258 N.E.2d 254 (10th Dist. 1969). However, in contrast to the statutory rem-
edy, the common law tort in Ohio requires actual malice, lack of probable cause, and
precedent arrest of the plaintiff or seizure of his property. Id. at 66, 258 N.E.2d at 257.
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struction of apartment buildings over the past twenty years
coupled with the falling rate of return in the early seventies has
been an impetus for the conversion of apartment buildings into
condominiums. Landlords may find it more profitable to convert
rental property and sell it as units than to repair and improve the
property or to sell it to another landlord or investor. 0 3 This con-
version of rental units to condominiums can create difficulties for
the former tenants and for prospective purchasers of the condo-
minium units.
a. Problems Facing Tenants. When landlords convert their
apartment buildings into condominiums, tenants face displace-
ment. Landlords may provide in their leases for the termination of
the tenancy upon the conversion to a condominium'0 4 or they may
give the tenant an option in the lease to either buy or vacate the
unit upon conversion.10 Even with this option, tenants unwilling
or unable to buy are forced from their homes. Especially in urban
areas, this displacement affects disproportionately the middle- and
lower-income dwellers and the elderly on fixed incomes.10 6 Sec-
tion 5311.25(G) attempts to protect tenants of apartment buildings
about to be converted to condominiums by requiring that they be
given an option to purchase an interest in the condominium and
120 days' written notice before being required to vacate. 10 7
The nature of the tenant's option under section 5311.25 is un-
certain. The section provides that no conversion condominium'08
may be offered for sale or sold unless "all tenants were offered an
option, exercisable within not less than ninety days after notice, to
purchase a condominium ownership interest in the development
103. The pressure to convert becomes stronger in cities where rent control is in effect.
Note, Tenant Protection in Condominium Conversions: The New York Experience, 48 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 978, 978-81 (1974).
104. Note, Conversion of Apartments to Condominiums and Cooperatives: Protecting the
Tenants in New York, 8 U. MICH J.L. REF. 705, 708 n.26 (1975); Note, supra note 43, at
328.
105. Note, supra note 103, at 983.
106. Id. at 984, 991.
107. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
108. Section 5311.01(X) defines a "conversion condominium development" as "a con-
dominium development that was originally operated as a rental property occupied by te-
nants" before it was offered for sale as condominium property. Id. § 5311.01(X). The
inclusion of the words "occupied by tenants" is commendable. The Council of State Gov-
ernments' Model Condominium Act definition uses only "occupied," which might cause a
condominium development to come within the conversion provision unnecessarily if a de-
veloper had used part of a new condominium for storage or for an office. MODEL CONDO-
MUNIUM ACT § 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
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.. .. "109 Exactly what notice is required by this section is un-
clear. A literal reading of the language suggests that it refers to
notice of the tenant's option to buy. A tenant would thus be enti-
tled to a ninety-day option commencing upon notification of the
option by the developer. Such an interpretation is supported by
the different notice requirements provided in the section. The sec-
tion requires written notice of vacation" ° but makes no mention
of a required written notice regarding the tenant's option. Con-
ceivably this distinction is based on the nature of an option as an
interest in land under the Statute of Frauds,' thus obviating the
need to mention a required written notice for the option. Further,
reading the notice provision as referring to the option would serve
the presumed statutory purpose of protecting potentially displaced
tenants by giving them sufficient time to consider the opportunity
and to procure any available financing.
However, a Senate Judiciary Committee report suggests that
the legislature intended that the notice referred to in section
5311.25 be notice "of the conversion.""' 2 This interpretation
would require only that the developer offer the tenant an option to
purchase sometime during the ninety-day period following notice
of conversion." 3 Since such notice would not have to be in writ-
ing, under this approach a tenant with constructive notice of the
conversion would have the option period reduced to .ninety days
after learning of the fact. Similarly, even if written notice of the
conversion were provided, the tenant's option period might be re-
duced by the developer withholding the option until later in the
109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page Supp. 1978). A "condominium own-
ership interest" is defined under the amendments as "a fee simple estate or a ninety-nine
year leasehold estate, renewable forever, in a unit, together with an appurtenant undivided
interest in the common areas and facilities." Id. § 5311.01(M). Thus, a developer need not
grant the tenant an option to purchase the particular unit previously occupied by the ten-
ant. Other statutes specifically provide that the tenant shall have the exclusive right to buy
the unit that he occupied as a tenant. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-88b(b) (West 1978);
accord, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.402(3)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
110. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
I11. See Holtz v. Lovejoy, 30 Ohio L. Rep. 114,7 Ohio L. Abs. 675 (8th Dist. Ct. App.
1929) (holding that an option for the purchase of land constituted a sufficient memoran-
dum in writing under the Statute of Frauds upon which to order specific performance); 2 A.
CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 418 (2d ed. 1950); 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 449 (3d ed. 1960).
112. SENATE JuDIcIARY COMM., REPORT ON AM. SuB. H.B. 404, 112th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. 3 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as COMMrrTEE REPORT].
113. "[I]n the case of a conversion condominium development, all tenants have been
given an option to purchase an interest within 90 days after notice of the conversion ...
(emphasis added). Id.
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ninety-day period.' 14 Thus, under the Judiciary Committee's in-
terpretation, if a developer notified a tenant of the conversion and
provided the tenant with an option eighty nine days later, the ten-
ant would receive only a one-day option that would still bring the
developer into compliance with the statute. Such a constrained
reading of the statute certainly would not offer tenants much pro-
tection against displacement. Other statutes, recognizing a devel-
oper's interest in an early option period, explicitly limit the option
to a specified period following written notice of the conversion" 15
or of an intent to convert' 1 6 and grant the option as a matter of
law. 17
Under section 5311.25 nonpurchasing tenants who entered
into their leases after October 1, 1978,'18 may be evicted from
their premises in order to facilitate conversion if they have been
given written notice at least 120 days before being required to va-
cate. 19 Once again it is unclear what notice is required by the
section. Both a literal reading of the section and the Judiciary
Committee report support an interpretation requiring notice to va-
cate the premises.120 There is no reason why notice to vacate can-
not be given after the developer has the tenant's negative response
regarding the option to purchase as long as an additional 120-day
period is given to the tenant before vacation of the premises. How-
ever, since the tenant's decision may well depend on the mistaken
belief that he may stay for the remainder of the lease period, it is
submitted that the tenant should be informed of the 120-day pro-
vision at the same time he is informed of the conversion and the
option to buy.
Although section 5311.25 is an attempt to balance the compet-
ing interests of developers and tenants, it nevertheless now places
the developer's interest in facilitating conversion above the ten-
114. The statute does not require that notice of the conversion and notice of the option
to buy be given at the same time.
115. MODEL ACT, supra note 108, § 11(b).
116. CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-88b(b) (West 1978).
117. Id.; MODEL AcT, supra note 108, § 1 l(b).
118. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
119. Id Developers will have to resort to the Ohio forcible entry and detainer statute,
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1923 (Page Supp. 1977), to evict nonpurchasing tenants from the
premises 120 days after notice to vacate has been given. Under § 1923.02(E), .02(F) an
action may be brought "[w]hen the defendant is an occupier of lands or tenements, without
color of title, and to which the complainant has the right of possession" or "[in any other
case of their unlawful detention."
120. "[AII tenants. . . have been given at least 120 days notice to vacate the prem-
ises." COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 112, at 3.
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ant's interest in securing stable housing.' 2 ' Perhaps a better ap-
proach toward reconciling developer and tenant interests would
be that taken by the Council of State Governments' Model Con-
dominium Act. The Model Act permits tenants to remain until
the end of any written lease and avoids hardships for developers
by imposing a two-year limitation on the time a tenant may
stay.'22 The Model Act also gives tenants thirty days after notice
of conversion to terminate their lease if they so wish, although
they in turn must give the developer ninety days notice prior to
termination.'23 This would be particularly beneficial to tenants
with leases extending beyond the two-year limitation. Further, to
prevent tenants from mistakenly relying on the possibility of a
lease renewal, the section should retain the present requirement
that the tenant be notified at least 120 days before being required
to vacate. It is submitted that recognition of these offsetting rights
to possession and the mutual duties of notification would provide
a better balance of the competing interests of developers and te-
nants than does the present approach of section 5311.25.124
121. Absent § 5311.25(G), a tenant cannot be evicted upon conversion before the expi-
ration of the lease period since at common law a transfer of the lessor's interest does not
terminate the tenancy nor deprive the lessee of any rights. See Olds v. Morse, 98 Ohio
App. 382, 129 N.E.2d 644 (9th Dist. 1954); Parsons v. Weinstein, 19 Ohio App. 52 (1st Dist.
1924); Dunkel v. Hedges, 15 Ohio App. 259 (4th Dist. 1921).
122. MODEL AcT, supra note 108, § 1 (b). The Model Act, however, provides less pro-
tection for tenants occupying the premises under an oral lease. The developer may termi-
nate the tenancy upon 90 days' notice of conversion and termination. In Ohio a rental
agreement may be written or oral under § 5321.01(D). OHio Rav. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.01(D) (Page Supp. 1977). It is submitted that all tenants should be granted the same
notice provisions since the tenant under an oral lease, if he can prove the existence and
terms of such lease, deserves no less protection than the tenant under a written lease.
123. MODEL AcT, supra note 108, § 11(b).
124. There are other approaches Ohio might also wish to consider. Until July 1, 1977,
New York provided that 35% of the tenants in occupancy had to agree to purchase their
units before conversion could take place. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1-a)(l)(i) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1977). However, tenants were still subject to misrepresentation and harassment
by landlords and developers to either leave or buy their units. Note, supra note 104, at 711.
Considerable case law has developed in New York over these practices. See I P. ROHAN &
M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 3A.06, at 3A-16. In addition, a minority could still dictate its
decision to the majority, Note, supra note 103, at 984, and tenants could be evicted once the
35% approval was obtained if they were unwilling or unable to buy.
Florida uses a combination of the notice and consent approaches, which provides for
added flexibility. A developer must provide 120 days' notice before a lease can be termi-
nated, unless the tenants of at least 60% of the units agree to the conversion. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 718.402(2), .402(3)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1978). This higher figure would seem to make
conversion much more difficult, but it must be noted that (1) the tenants do not have to
agree to purchase the unit, but merely to agree to the conversion; (2) the developer can vote
empty units as he pleases; and (3) he may provide less than 120 days' notice and avoid the
60% requirement if he grants a 90-day option to buy at the same or lower price offered to
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b. Problems Confronting Prospective Purchasers. Buyers of
conversion condominiums also face difficulties. They are buying
older buildings, which are more likely to have structural defects or
require the replacement of entire electrical, heating, or plumbing
systems.125 Purchasers may be unaware of these defects. 2 6 While
implied warranties of fitness and habitability have been judicially
recognized in sales of residential premises, 27 such warranties have
been limited to the sales of new buildings to the original buyer
and have not yet been extended to resales of the property. 28 Sim-
ilarly, warranty protection provided by most condominium legis-
lation has been limited to newly constructed condominiums. 29
Maintenance and repair costs is another problem that con-
fronts the purchasers of conversion condominiums. The seller
may underestimate these costs, 130 and the purchaser cannot gauge
nontenants or if the term of the lease has less than 150 days left after the notice of conver-
sion is given. Id. § 718.402(3)(a)(1), .402(3)(a)(2).
Connecticut provides that no eviction proceedings may be brought for failure to
purchase, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-88b(f) (West 1978), although the necessity of this
provision is open to debate.
One commentator has suggested, as an alternative to the notice and consent or agree-
ment to purchase schemes, that eviction be permitted only if the tenant has been provided
with substitute accomodations. Note, supra note 104, at 718. This probably would de-
crease the number of conversions and has yet to be adopted by any state.
125. Note, supra note 43, at 327.
126. Id.
127. See Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), afdper curiam, 264 So.
2d 418 (Fla. 1972) (implied warranties of fitness and 'merchantability extend to the
purchase of new condominiums from builders).
128. Gable expressly left open the issue of subsequent purchasers. "We ponder, but do
not decide, what result would occur if more remote purchasers were involved. We recog-
nize that liability must have an end but question the creation of any artificial limits of
either time or remoteness to the original purchaser." Id. at 18.
It has been suggested that both original and subsequent owners within multiple-family
buildings should have standing to sue for breach of an implied warranty that harms every
owner. 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 619, 623 (1973). Some courts have been willing to dispense
with a strict privity requirement. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965) (entertaining purchaser's lessee's action against the lendor-builder); Gay v.
Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972) (entertaining an action by the first occu-
pier who was a subsequent purchaser).
129. Florida extends the implied warranty of fitness and merchantability to each unit
and its roof-and-structural components for three years commencing with the completion of
construction of each building or improvement. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(l)(a)(c) (West
Supp. 1978). Hawaii requires the developer to provide a one-year warranty against struc-
tural and appliance defects. The developer must also give notice to the owners and board
of directors that the warranty will expire in 90 days and must notify the owners of the
specific methods they may pursue in seeking remedies for any defect prior to the expiration
of the warranty. HAW. REv. STAT. § 514A-70 (Supp. 1977).
130. Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 7
COLUM. L. Rav. 118, 121 (1971).
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them since he has never been responsible, as a prior tenant or as a
homeowner, for an entire multiunit building or complex. The re-
suit is that buyers eventually pay unexpected and increased
costs1 31 which were often foreseen or delayed by sellers and which
may represent the seller's motivation for conversion.
Section 5311.26(G)1 32 addresses the problems facing prospec-
tive purchasers of converted condominium units and is part of the
disclosure-approach of the amendments. 33 The section requires
the developer to tell the age and condition of the property and to
give his opinion of the useful life of the structure and the mechan-
ical and supporting systems. The developer must also project re-
pair and replacement costs five years into the future. In order to
determine all this information the developer must inspect any rel-
evant drawings and records as well as the structural elements and
the mechanical and supporting systems. Any limitations on this
inspection imposed by the site's physical limits must also be dis-
closed. The developer must make a reasonable effort to ascertain
the required information since an intentional failure to do so will
subject him to the penalties of section 5311.27.134
In contrast to the disclosures required by other state statutes,
section 5311.26 has several notable omissions. For example, there
is no provision for an independent expert opinion, such as the re-
port of an engineer or architect, as provided by two other stat-
utes. 1 35 Such a provision would safeguard the buyer against a
dishonest developer. The section also fails to provide for a report
of any termite infestation, 36 or the disclosure of the installation
and construction dates of the structural systems along with a re-
port of their repairs.137A further inadequacy of the Act is its fail-
ure to define supporting systems. The roof, plumbing, and
electrical system should be included in any definition since the
content of the developer's report will no doubt depend on the stat-
131. Note, supra note 43, at 327.
132. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
133. The disclosure required of conversion condominium developers is in addition to
that required of developers of newly constructed residential condominiums pursuant to
§ 5311.26.
134. Section 5311.26 speaks only in terms of an intentional omission of any material
fact or of any untrue statement. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
135. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.504(15)(c) (West Supp. 1978); UNIFORM CONDO-
MINIUM Acr § 4-104(a)(1) (1978).
136. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.504(15)(d) (West Supp. 1978).
137. Compare CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-88b(a)(4) (West 1978); VA. CODE
§ 55-79.94(a)(4) (Supp. 1978).
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ute's requirements. 38
Section 5311.26 requires a five-year projection of estimated re-
pair and replacement costs rather than a report of recent costs.
The objective of this requirement is to protect the prospective
buyer from relying on recent costs which may be deceptively low
because the seller has delayed repair and replacement in anticipa-
tion of conversion. However, figures reflecting actual expendi-
tures can be helpful to prospective purchasers and should be
required. Three statutes require a report of actual expenditures,
on a per unit basis, for repairs and maintenance for the previous
three years.' 39 Such a requirement would avoid any understate-
ment of costs and would supplement the projections.
3. Deposits and Downpayments
Prospective purchasers of condominium units are often re-
quired to make a deposit or downpayment to the developer in or-
der to secure their interest in a unit. The deposit is credited
toward the purchase price; if the buyer cannot fulfill his part of the
agreement, he forfeits the deposit to the developer as liquidated
damages." The main problem for purchasers is the loss of their
deposits through developer misuse and bankruptcy. The devel-
oper often will use the money to further finance development of
the condominium- to pay construction costs or such ongoing ex-
penses as wages and advertising.' 4 ' If the developer goes bank-
rupt and construction is uncompleted, the buyer risks losing his
deposit since mechanic's and materiaman's liens or other credi-
tors' claims may attach to any remaining funds, or the buyer's
claim may be subordinated to a construction lender's preferred
blanket mortgage. 42 Even if the deposit is eventually returned,
the developer may retain any income earned by the money.'4 3 In
fact, developers have been known to collect deposits merely to use
them to earn income, with no intention of ever constructing a con-
138. The Council of State Governments' Model Condominium Act is quite specific
regarding what must be inspected and reported, expressly covering the roofs, foundations,
external and supporting walls, mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and structural elements, as
well as any other related facilities. MODEL Act, supra note 108, § lI(a)(3).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-88b(a)(2) (West 1978); VA. CODE § 55-79.94(a)(2)
(Supp. 1978); MODEL AcT, supra note 108, § l1(a)(2).
140. R. SEMENOW, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REAL ESTATE 143 (8th ed. 1975).
141. Comment, supra note 20, at 271.
142. Crockett, Protecting the Deposit of the 'Consumer' Who Purchases a New Condo-
minium Apartment, 8 HAW. B.J. 103, 104-05 (1972).
143. Comment, supra note 20, at 278.
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dominium.' 4 On the other hand, there are policy justifications
for developers' use of deposits. Developers, especially those en-
gaged in small-scale construction, may need the purchasers' de-
posits to help finance the development of the condominium.
145
Construction lenders may require that a certain percentage of
units be presold and deposits be taken.' 46 Purchasers may even
benefit from developer access to their deposits since interest
charges paid by the developer on alternative forms of financing
will be passed on to the purchaser. 47
Section 5311.25(A) 148 of the amended Ohio statute fills a void
left by the 1963 Act, 149 which was silent on the use of deposits by
developers. This section now requires that the deposit or down-
payment be held in trust or be put in escrow until the settlement of
the transaction or until its return to the buyer or forfeiture to the
developer. If a deposit of two thousand dollars or more is held for
more than ninety days, interest must be paid at an annual rate of
four percent, starting on the ninetieth day, to the purchaser upon
the settlement or return of the deposit or to the developer upon
forfeiture. 50 The section further provides that such deposits are
144. Note, supra note 81, at 350.
145. Note, Recent Innovations in State Condominium Legislation, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
994, 1000 (1974).
146. Crockett, supra note 142, at 103.
147. Id. at 104.
148. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(A) (Page Supp. 1978)
149. Although the 1963 Act did not specifically address the issue of deposit protection,
various alternative remedies were available. Ohio holds promoters of stock to a fiduciary
duty both to the corporation and to those whom they induce to buy stock. See Yeiser v.
United States Bd. & Paper Co., 107 F. 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1901); Commonwealth S.S. Co. v.
American Shipbuilding Co., 197 F. 797, 805 (N.D. Ohio 1912), mod//ed on other grounds,
215 F. 296 (6th Cir. 1914). Condominium developers have never been held to such a duty
in Ohio. However, considering the similarity in structure of a corporation and a unit own-
ers association and the analogous functions of a stock promoter and developer, the argu-
ment could have been made that developers should occupy a fiduciary relationship with
the unit owners and their association. If a developer were held to a fiduciary duty, he
would be required to deposit the funds he received in that capacity in a bank or savings
and loan association to gather interest. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2109.41 (Page 1976).
He would be unable to make any personal use of the funds. See id. § 2109.43. Holding the
developer to such a responsibility would certainly protect the purchaser's deposit. How-
ever, some less stringent method of deposit protection would be more appropriate consider-
ing the developer's need to make at least limited use of the funds in order to successfully
complete construction.
150. Section 5311.25 is progressive in providing for the payment of interest to the buyer
after 90 days on deposits of $2,000 or more, assuming there is no forfeiture, which would
usually take the form of the buyer's default or breach of the purchase agreement. This is
unusual; even the most protective statutes provide that interest be paid to the developer
upon closing. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(l)(c) (West Supp. 1978). The section also pro-
tects both the purchaser and the developer by providing that the creditors of either party
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not subject to attachment by the developer's or purchaser's credi-
tors.'" Section 5311.26 provides that the statute's requirement for
the escrow of deposits be disclosed to each prospective purchaser
in writing.
15 2
Section 5311.25 gives the developer and purchaser much free-
dom in selecting the escrow agent or trustee. There is no require-
ment, for example, that the funds be deposited in an institution
where they will be insured by a state or federal agency, as re-
quired by the Council of State Governments' Model Condomin-
ium Act.' 53 Where an escrow account is established, however, the
depository necessarily will be a separate party who shall act as the
may not attach the deposits. In this way, the developer cannot indirectly spend the buyer's
money, and the money will not be lost in the event of bankruptcy. Hawaii is a good exam-
ple of how a state that follows a regulatory approach handles the deposit problem. See
Crockett, supra note 142, at 103-04. The developer must submit an escrow agreement,
along with other documents and plans, to the state Real Estate Commission. HAW. REV.
STAT. § 514A-39 (Supp. 1977). Units may then be sold, but deposits must be held in es-
crow and cannot be disbursed until the Commission issues a final public report. HAW.
REV. STAT. § 514A-65 (Supp. 1977). A final report will be issued only if, among other
things, there are sufficient funds to complete construction and an escrow agreement is filed.
The agrement must provide that no disbursement from the balance of the escrow funds,
after payment of construction costs, will be allowed unless all mechanic's and material-
man's liens have been cleared. HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-40(3), -40(6)(B) (Supp. 1977).
Disbursements may be made, after the final report for construction costs, in proportion to
the work completed and may be used to pay various fees and other incidental costs. HAw.
RE. STAT. § 514A-67 (Supp. 1977). Thus, consumers are protected from unscrupulous or
unsound developers. Although more protection would be afforded if the use of purchaser
funds were more restricted, see Crockett, supra note 142, at 107, as long as the developer
follows certain procedures, he may use funds as they are needed to help finish the project.
151. OHIO RE,. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
152. Id. § 5311.26(M).
153. MODEL AcT, supra note 108, § 14. Connecticut requires the declarant to establish
an escrow account with a bank, trust company with trust powers, an attorney, or title com-
pany. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-74d(b) (West 1978). Florida includes a registered real
estate broker in that list. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(l) (West Supp. 1978).
Even if an Ohio developer were to establish an escrow account with a real estate broker,
the funds would ultimately end up in a special or trust bank account which the broker must
maintain. OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.18(Z) (Page 1977). Failure to maintain such an
account could result in the suspension or revocation of the broker's license. Id. In addition,
Ohio real estate brokers are held to a fiduciary duty to both the purchaser and seller and
must hold any deposit or downpayment in trust. See Quinn v. State Bd. of Real Estate
Examiners, 104 Ohio App. 316,321, 137 N.E.2d 777,780 (8th Dist. 1956); Schoch v. Bloom,
5 Ohio Misc. 155, 158, 212 N.E.2d 428, 430 (C.P. Hamilton County 1965). Similarly, an
attorney must deposit funds of clients in an identifiable bank account maintained in the
same state as the law office. No funds of the lawyer may be deposited in the account except
to pay bank charges or unless the funds belong in part to the client and in part to the
attorney. OHIo CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 9-102A, 23 Ohio St.2d 1, 55
(1970). The attorney must also maintain complete records of all funds coming into his
possession, account to his client regarding them, and promptly pay or deliver such funds to
the client as he requests them. Id. 9-102(B)(3),-102(B)(4), 23 Ohio St.2d at 56.
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agent of both the developer and purchaser.1 54 Thus, the developer
may not act as an escrow agent. Usually the depository will be a
real estate broker, a bank, or a savings and loan association. Al-
though the depository may be the developer's lawyer, the typical
escrow agent is not an attorney. 155
Since, in addition to the escrow arrangement, section 5311.25
permits deposits to be held in trust, 156 a developer may become
the depository by having the purchaser appoint him as trustee.
1 57
Although merger problems prevent the creation of a trust where a
single beneficiary is the sole trustee, it is possible to establish a
trust where one of several beneficiaries is the sole trustee. 158 Thus,
a developer may maintain a trust account, similar to those main-
tained by many attorneys, in which to place purchaser deposits.
This approach, specifically adopted by two other states, 159 adds
flexibility and convenience to the handling of deposits. It may be
argued, however, that the practical convenience is outweighed by
the danger of self-dealing by the developer-trustee. A better ap-
proach would be to permit deposits to be held by developers
under bond.1 60 This would introduce a measure of purchaser pro-
tection to the practical advantages of developer-held deposits.
The section's requirement that developers place all the depos-
its in escrow or trust, not to be used for any purpose until the
154. An escrow agent or depository must be a third party, Squire v. Branciforti, 131
Ohio St. 344, 353, 2 N.E.2d 878, 882 (1936); McGriffv. McGriff, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 218, 223,
74 N.E.2d 619, 622 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1947), who is considered an agent and trustee of both
parties. 131 Ohio St. at 353, 2 N.E. at 882.
155. G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 544 (2d ed. 1974). Compare M. FRIED-
MAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY 10 (3d ed. 1975).
156. Virginia provides only for escrow, not trust accounts. VA. CODE § 55-79.95
(Supp. 1978). Hawaii does allow deposits in trust under escrow arrangements but prohibits
disbursement from that trust. HAw. REV. STAT. § 514A-65 (Supp. 1977).
157. Where both the legal title and equitable interest are in the same person, the two
interests are said to merge, defeating the trust and conferring a fee simple interest upon that
person. Hill v. Irons, 160 Ohio St. 21, 27, 113 N.E.2d 243, 247 (1953); In re Bicknell's
Estate, 108 Ohio App. 51, 54, 160 N.E.2d 550, 553 (3d Dist 1958); 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW
OF TRusTs § 99, at 795 (3d ed. 1967).
158. Where a person is a trustee for himself and others, there is no merger of the sepa-
rate interests. Burbach v. Burbach, 217 Il. 547, 550, 75 N.E. 519, 520 (1905); Fisher v.
Evatt, 18 Ohio Op. 34, 37 (B.T.A. 1943); ScoTr, supra note 157, § 99.3, at 800-01.
159. Connecticut, Florida, and Louisiana provide for a "special account" which pre-
sumably would cover a trust as well as an escrow account. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-74d(b)(3) (West 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(2) (West Supp. 1978); LA. REv.
STAT. § 9:1139(A) (West Supp. 1978).
160. The Model Condominium Act requires the deposit to be held in escrow or guaran-
teed by surety bond. MODEL ACT, supra note 108, § 14. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-74d(b) (West Supp. 1978) ("one-half of such [escrow] funds shall be held by the es-
crow agent as security for completion of the common elements .... ).
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settlement or its return or forfeiture, is similar to the approaches
taken by Virginia16 ' and the Council of State Governments. 62
This approach may be too restrictive. Although it protects the
buyer, the developer cannot contract to use the money for con-
struction, which may be essential to complete the project. Al-
though this encourages developers to seek sound and complete
financing from other sources, it discourages smaller enterprises
from starting up. Further, it may prevent a relatively stable devel-
oper from finishing construction. Three states provide a more
flexible approach to the problem. Connecticut, 63 Florida,"6 and
Louisiana 65 require that deposits be held in escrow, to be paid to
the seller at closing. The parties, however, are free to contract
otherwise. This permits the developer to make use of the deposit
or some portion of it in financing construction of the condomin-
ium. To prevent developers who are unable to complete construc-
tion from using deposits to pay incidental costs, Florida and
Louisiana further provide that deposits may not be used for the
salaries, commissions, or expenses of salesmen or for advertis-
ing.166 These states also provide that any contract that permits
developer use of deposits must advise the prospective purchaser of
this provision in boldface type just above the buyer's signature
line.167 Failure of the developer to comply with these provisions
allows the buyer to void the contract and may, in Florida and
Connecticut, subject the developer to criminal penalties. 68 Thus,
the purchaser is protected by these statutes, yet the buyer and de-
veloper are free to contract, if necessary, to allow the developer
access to the funds.
By permitting the release of the entire deposit upon settlement,
section 5311.25 fails to protect the purchaser of a condominium
161. VA. CODE § 55-79.95 (Supp. 1978).
162. MODEL AcT, supra note 108, § 14.
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-74d(b)(1) (West Supp. 1978) (half of all escrowed
deposit to be paid to seller at closing).
164. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(3) (West Supp. 1978).
165. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1139(B) (West Supp. 1978).
166. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(3) (West Supp. 1978) (for escrow funds exceeding 10%
of purchase price); LA. REv. STAT. § 9:1139(B) (West Supp. 1978).
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(3) (West Supp. 1978); LA. Rv. STAT. § 9:1139(B)
(West Supp. 1978).
168. Florida provides that any developer who willfully fails to pay the funds into es-
crow is guilty of a third degree felony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202(b) (West Supp. 1978).
Connecticut provides that if the developer fails to establish the escrow or if he or anyone
acting on his behalf wrongfully releases any of the funds to the developer with intent to
defraud the purchaser, he is guilty of embezzlement. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-74d(c)
(West Supp. 1978).
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unit that has not been completed, equipped, or landscaped or in
which construction of the common elements has not been finished.
More protection could be provided if only partial release of the
deposit to the developer were permitted upon closing and the re-
mainder reserved until completion of the project. One state that
follows this approach further provides that if the developer fails to
complete the common elements within five years of the first occu-
pancy, the balance of the deposits will be refunded to the unit
owners association.
169
4. Warranties
Prior to the recent amendments, Ohio, unlike the majority of
states, provided no implied warranty protection for the purchaser
of a home, condominium, or other completed dwelling.1 70 Rather,
Ohio relegated the home purchaser to a cause of action in
fraud,' 7 ' breach of contract 172 or breach of express warranty if one
was given, 173 or tort.174 The net result was that the Ohio home
169. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-74d(b) (West 1978).
170. In Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966), the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a contract to furnish labor and materials is not a sale if the
finished product is not personal property and thus refused to imply a warranty that an
uncompleted real property structure would be suitable for the intended purpose when
finished. The court distinguished Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d
819 (8th Dist. 1957), which had held that if a house not yet completed was sold, there
would be an implied warranty that the house would be finished in a reasonably efficient,
workmanlike manner and would be reasonably fit for its intended use, on the grounds that
the parties in Vanderschrier had an implied bargain as to uncompleted work that extended
beyond the transfer of title. Although the Mitchem approach was once the majority rule,
see Gabel v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), af'rdper curiam, 264 So. 2d 418
(Fla. 1972), Ohio is now in the minority by refusing to imply a warranty that a dwelling
sold by a builder has been constructed in a workmanlike manner and is fit for habitation.
See Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts ofLiability in the Development andAdministration of Condo-
minium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915, 957 (1976).
It has been suggested that the reluctance to hold builders liable on an implied warranty
theory arises because the deed of conveyance evidencing the actual transfer of title usually
purports to be the full agreement of the parties and excludes all other terms and liabilities.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352, Comment a (1965). Florida has explicitly recog-
nized implied warranties of fitness and merchantability against builders of condominiums
for the realty and every integral part thereof. Gabel v. Silver, 258 So. 2d at 13.
171. See, e.g., Pumphrey v. Quillen, 165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N.E. 2d 328 (1956); Drew v.
Christopher Constr. Co., 140 Ohio St. 1, 41 N.E. 2d 1018 (1942).
172. Rapp v. Murray, 112 Ohio App. 344, 171 N.E. 2d 374 (Ist Dist. 1960); Galvin v.
Keen, 100 Ohio App. 100, 135 N.E. 2d 769 (5th Dist. 1954); Kissinger v. Yellow Pine Bldg.
Co., 21 Ohio App. 165, 152 N.E. 775 (1st Dist. 1925).
173. See, ag., Tibbs v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369
N.E.2d 1218 (1st Dist. 1977).
174. The purchaser had to prove that the builder had breached his duty to use ordinary
care and skill and to perform in a workmanlike manner. See, e.g., Lloyd v. William Fanin
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buyer had to put up with a defective product simply because the
product he purchased was real estate rather than goods.
175
With the enactment of section 5311.25,176 Ohio has statutorily
granted warranty protection to the purchaser of a condominium,
under certain conditions.1 77 This section creates two warranties,
one on the common areas and one on the individual unit.178 First,
section 5311.25 requires a developer or his agent to provide in the
condominium instruments a two-year warranty on the common
areas. It must cover the full cost of labor and materials for repair
and replacement of the roof and structural components as well as
mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and common service elements
serving the condominium property or additional property as a
whole. 179 The warranty provisions are activated when the repair
or replacement of these elements is necessary because of a defect
in material or workmanship.1 80 This warranty begins to run on
the date the deed is recorded for the sale of the first condominium
ownership interest in the development to a good faith purchaser
for value.18' In the case of expandable condominiums, for any
additional property submitted through an amendment to the dec-
laration, the same two-year warranty begins to run on the record-
ing of the deed for the sale of the first condominium ownership
interest in the additional property to a good faith purchaser for
Builders, Inc., 40 Ohio App. 2d 507, 320 N.E.2d 738 (10th Dist. 1973); Hulder v. Bachman,
12 Ohio Misc. 22, 230 N.E.2d 461 (C.P. Ashland County 1967). See generally Mitchem v.
Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
175. In the sale of goods the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose apply under §§ 1302.27-.28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.27-.28
(Page 1962). Some states have implied a covenant of habitability running to the home
purchaser. Generally the home must be rendered unfit for habitation before the covenant
will be considered breached. See Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970)
(heating and air conditioning ducts were flooded); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415
P.2d 698 (1966) (water seeped into basement); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
1968) (house burned the first time a fire was lit in the fireplace).
176. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
177. Id. § 5311.24(A) restricts the applicability of § 5311.25 to residential condomini-
ums.
178. Since the warranties run for specified time periods, presumably the resale pur-
chaser will also receive the benefit of the warranty protection.
179. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(E) (Page Supp. 1978). Section 53 11.01(A) de-
fines condominium property as the "land, all buildings, improvements, and structures on
the land, all easements, rights, and appurtenances belonging to the land, and all articles of
personal property submitted to the provisions. . . of this chapter." Additional property is
defined at § 5311.01(Q) as the "land or improvements described in the original declaration
that may be added in the future to an expandable condominium property." For a discus-
sion of expandable condominiums, see notes 446-78 infra and accompanying text.
180. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
181. Id. § 5311.25(E)(1).
[Vol. 29:147
CONDOMINIUM LA-W REFORM
value.' 82 Second, the statute requires the developer to furnish a
one-year warranty on elements pertaining to individual units.
This one-year warranty also covers the cost of labor and materials
required to repair or replace structural, mechanical, and other ele-
ments that are damaged because of a defect in materials or work-
manship. 183 The one-year warranty begins to run on the date the
deed is recorded following the first sale of a condominium owner-
ship interest to a good faith purchaser for value. 84 If the devel-
oper assigns to the purchaser any express or implied warranty that
the manufacturer has given him on appliances, he is not required
to give his own one-year warranty on the appliances.8 5 In such a
case the developer need warrant only the installation of the appli-
ances.'8 6 Finally, any warranties made to the developer that ex-
ceed the time periods required by the amendments must be
assigned to the purchaser.1
8 7
Generally, the warranties imposed in other states cover the
same items as those in Ohio-the common and individual unit
mechanical and structural elements, the electrical and plumbing
systems, the roof, and any personal property or appliances con-
veyed. The Ohio Act, however, does not define the term "com-
mon service elements." Since the term "common areas and
facilities" was not used, the legislature must have intended war-
ranty coverage to extend to something less than that. Section
531 1.01(B)(1)(d) refers to central services such as power, light, gas,
hot and cold water, refrigeration, air conditioning, and incinerat-
ing. If the term "services" includes only those functions, then
common services means those services used in common. Thus, the
warranty would seem not to apply to landscaping, grading, park-
ing and road areas, or any other potentially defective portions of
the condominium property. This portion of the amendment needs
to be clarified since the purchaser may have broad expectations as
to warranty coverage for these items and may subsequently dis-
cover his warranty protection to be quite limited.
182. Id. § 5311.25(E)(2).
183. Id. § 5311.25(E).
184. Id. § 5311.25(E)(3). The requirement in § 5311.25 that the first sale be to a good
faith purchaser for value prevents the developer from avoiding the warranty obligations.
Otherwise he could begin the running of the warranty time period simply by conveying the
ownership interest to himself or to a strawman.
185. Id. § 5311.25(E)(4).
186. Id. Presumably the installation warranty will be for one year, as are other warran-
ties regarding the unit.
187. Id. § 5311.25(E)(5).
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Although section 5311.25 adds protection for the condomin-
ium buyer, perhaps the protection is not enough. First, the war-
ranties cover only the costs of repair and replacement and do not
cover resulting losses. The purchaser must resort to common law
remedies to recover consequential damages.
Second, since the time limit for the warranties commences
upon the first recording of a deed, many subsequent purchasers
will receive no warranty protection. It may take several years for
the developer to complete construction of the condominium devel-
opment, particularly recreational facilities and landscaping. A
purchaser who buys a newly constructed unit one year after the
first sale will receive no warranty protection on his unit, and if the
common service areas are not completed within two years follow-
ing the first sale, no warranty will apply to them either. In the
case of expandable condominiums, it is unlikely that any warranty
protection will be provided for elements pertaining to individual
units because the period of the one-year warranty begins to run
upon the recording of the first sale in the initial phase. 188 While
the time limits for the section's warranties are not atypical com-
pared to the provisions of other states,189 a few states provide
more warranty protection simply by commencing the warranty
period when the unit or common elements are completed or the
unit conveyed. 9 ° Since Ohio has recognized the need for war-
ranty protection, it should also require that the time period begin
when the unit is conveyed or the common service areas completed.
Third, permitting the developer to satisfy his warranty require-
ments on appliances by assigning the manufacturer's warranties to
the purchaser renders enforcement of that warranty by the pur-
chaser more difficult. The manufacturer may reside out of state
and be difficult to locate. The manufacturer's warranty may re-
quire the goods to be shipped prepaid to the point of manufacture
to have the warranty honored.' The appliances may be affixed
188. Id. § 5311.25(E)(3).
189. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.203 (West Supp. 1978), which requires three-year
warranties on each unit. Plumbing, electricity, and the common structural and mechanical
components have warranties for three to five years, depending on when the owners take
control of the association.
190. Connecticut uses the date of the recording of the original condominium instru-
ments, the date of first occupancy, and the date of closing. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-74e (West 1978). Florida uses the completion of the building and the date when the
unit owners other than the developer take control of the association. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 718.203 (West Supp. 1978). Virginia uses the date of conveyance. VA. CODE § 44-79.79
(Supp. 1978).
191. If the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), were to ap-
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to the real estate and difficult to move. The cost of repair or re-
placement of a defective appliance may be minimal compared to
the cost of enforcing the warranty. Moreover, the manufacturer's
warranty may provide the purchaser with less warranty protection
than is provided by statute. Connecticut192 and Florida,193 for ex-
ample, impose warranties on the contractor, subcontractor, and
suppliers. As additional protection the Council on State Govern-
ments' Model Condominium Act would require the developer to
post a bond. 94 Then the costs of repair or replacement would not
be imposed upon the condominium purchaser if the developer
went bankrupt or enforcement of the warranty against the manu-
facturer proved too difficult.
Finally, the developer must assign the condominium purchaser
any warranty given to him in excess of the statute's specified time
periods. This seems at first glance to afford the purchaser exten-
sive warranty protection. 195 However, it is unlikely that warranty
protection from the developer's seller will exceed two years. Ad-
ditionally, the statute does not specify how the length of the time
period is to be determined. For example, the statute requires the
developer to assign his seller's warranty to the purchaser if it ex-
ceeds the one-year statutory warranty. Even if the seller's war-
ranty is for two years, eighteen months may have elapsed from the
time of the transaction between the seller and developer to that
between the developer and condominium purchaser. If the devel-
oper assigns his warranty, it would expire in six months. The
buyer would get less warranty protection than that afforded with-
out the assignment. In this situation the seller's warranty assigned
to the purchaser may be longer than the one-year developer's war-
ranty, but only the latter would be still effective. Such a con-
strained reading of the statute would be inconsistent, however,
with its remedial purpose and the apparent intent of the legisla-
ture to afford some warranty coverage to the condominium pur-
ply to the appliances supplied by the developer to the unit owners, it would arguably pro-
hibit a prepaid shipment. requirement. "Consumer" is defined at § 2301(3) as "any other
person who is entitled ... under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor...
the obligations of the warranty... "' Presumably this would cover the unit owner who is
assigned the manufacturer's warranty by the developer under § 5311.25(E)(4) of the Ohio
amendments. If so, the prepaid shipment requirement might be seen as an unreasonable
duty placed upon the consumer, which is prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1).
192. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-74e(b)(1)(B), -74e(b)(2)(B) (West 1978).
193. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.203(2) (West Supp. 1978).
194. MODEL AcT, supra note 108, § 13(b).
195. OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(E)(5) (Page Supp. 1978).
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chaser. The legislature most likely intended that the statute
require the developer to assign his seller's warranty to the condo-
minium purchaser if the warranty would afford him a longer pe-
riod of protection than the statutory time periods of one and two
years. 196
B. Restrictions on Developer Retention of Control
One of the most difficult aspects of condominium development
is the transfer of control from the developer to the unit owners
association. During the initial stages of construction, the devel-
oper generally owns all the units and has complete control of the
condominium property. After the development is completed and
unit titles have been conveyed, control passes to the unit owners
association as provided by statute.197 The developer's extensive
power during the development period has, however, facilitated a
number of abuses, which will be discussed below. These include
prolonged control of the unit owners association, sweetheart con-
tracts, and abuses in regard to the rental of unsold units.
Despite the numerous means for retention of control, the po-
tential for abuse, and the inadequacy of judicial efforts to curb
such abuse, 198 none of the enabling acts, as originally enacted,
196. The statute is also unclear about the purchaser's remedies should the developer
fail to provide him with the necessary warranties. Section 5311.25 requires the developer to
include the warranties in the condominium sales instruments. OHIO Rav. CODE ANN.
§ 5311.25 (Page Supp. 1978). Thus they become part of the agreement between the pur-
chaser and the developer. If the developer does not include the warranties in the instru-
ments, the purchaser receives no warranty protection. The purchaser may, however, have
remedies under § 5311.27. See notes 94-101 supra and accompanying text.
197. OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(A) (Page Supp. 1978). See notes 208-30 infra
and accompanying text.
198. To eliminate the problems that occur during the development period, some courts
have held that the developer or promoter occupies a fiduciary relationship with the future
unit owners association and its members. See, e.g., Shore Terrace Coop. Inc. v. Roche, 25
App. Div. 2d 666, 268 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1966), discussed in Comment, Areas of Dir-
pute in Condominium Law, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 979, 981 (1976). In an accounting
action by a nonprofit cooperative apartment association against its promoters, the court
held, by analogizing the nonprofit cooperative corporation to the typical private corpora-
tion, that the traditional fiduciary duties of a promoter to the corporation and its stockhold-
ers applied. Accord, Ireland v. Wynkoup, 539 P.2d 1349 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). Other
courts have applied corporate law to condominium associations. See cases cited in Hyatt &
Rhoads, supra note 170, at 975 n.260. The Florida courts, in a series of cases, have adopted
corporate law for use in the condominium context. See Point E. Management Corp. v.
Point E. One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921
(1974); Riviera Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Weinberger, 231 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1970);
Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Fountainview Ass'n, Inc.
v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
These cases, however, have produced disastrous results for unit owners because the courts
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specifically regulated retention of developer control. The only reg-
ulation that existed was in the form of Federal Housing Authority
regulations and some state administrative regulations, which typi-
cally required that control of the board be turned over to the unit
owners by a certain date.199 Recent legislative enactments in sev-
eral states,2 ' including the recent amendments to the Ohio Act,
signal a move toward the formulation of statutory solutions to the
problem of developer abuse, which will minimize the need for ju-
dicial intervention. The difficulty with drafting this legislation is
that it must minimize developer abuse while permitting the con-
trol necessary to develop a condominium in its initial stages.
Given this task, the approach of the recent Ohio amendments is
commendable.
1. Prolonged Control of the Owners Association
Initial developer control is necessary to facilitate the sale of
units and the commencement of operations, to insure exterior
maintenance, and to protect the developer from harassment by
early purchasers.2 ' The developer's dual role of businessman and
initial director of the unit owners association, however, gives rise
to a conflict of interests, and may cause the developer to engage in
practices that are not in the best interest of other unit owners.2 °2
For example the developer may enter into, on behalf of the asso-
have denied relief on the basis of the minority rule, followed in Florida, that a promoter is
not required to act in a fiduciary manner toward potential purchasers of stock in a corpora-
tion. Most commentators, however, regard the Florida rule as an aberration and instead
favor imposing a fiduciary duty on the promoter-developer. See, e.g., Hyatt & Rhoads,
supra note 170, at 973.
Although there has been no litigation on this issue in Ohio, the application of corporate
law in this area would be beneficial to unit owners because Ohio imposes on a promoter a
fiduciary duty to the corporation and to his subscribers. Eg., Yeiser v. United States Bd. &
Paper Co., 107 F. 340 (6th Cir. 1901); Commonwealth S.S. Co. v. American Shipbuilding
Co., 197 F. 797 (N.D. Ohio 1912), modffedon other grounds, 215 F. 296 (6th Cir. 1914).
Promoters may not accept secret commissions from third persons and may sell their own
property to the corporation only after disclosure of all material facts, including any per-
sonal interest, to an independent board of directors. Unit owners could also ask a court to
impose a fiduciary duty outside the corporate law context as well, using a trust and confi-
dence theory. See Taylor v. Shields, 64 Ohio Law Abs. 193, 111 N.E.2d 595 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1951); Federman v. Stanwyck, 63 Ohio Law Abs. 178, 108 N.E.2d 339 (8th Dist. Ct.
App. 1951).
199. 1 P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 17A.02[41, at 17A-3.2.
200. E.g., HAw. Rav. STAT. § 514A-82(12) to 82(15) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 515.195(1) (West Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-16.5(), .5(4) (Supp. 1977).
201. See Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 170, at 926; Rohan, supra note 45, at 1037.
202. Hyatt, Condominium and Home Owners Associatiotn Formation and Development,
24 EMORY L.. 977, 989 (1975).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ciation, self-dealing management contracts and recreational
leases2° 3 or engage in "lowballing," a practice in which assess-
ments are set at a low, fixed rate in order to enhance the salability
of units.2° Funds may not be accounted for nor books kept;
205
the declaration, bylaws, rules, and management contracts may be
kept from prospective buyers;20 6 and common facilities that are
defective or not built to specification may be accepted without
complaint by a developer-controlled association.20 7
Prior to the recent amendments, abuses could be perpetuated
since a developer could maintain control of the association indefi-
nitely by retaining ownership of a certain percentage of units, sell-
ing units to friendly parties or straw buyers, "packing" the
association's managing board with friends and associates, or re-
serving the right to amend unilaterally the condominium bylaws
or declaration.20" The amendments strike a balance between pres-
ervation of the developer's investment and the protection of unit
owners from unfair management practices. This is done primarily
through the establishment of a time requirement for the initial
owners meeting and a timetable for the gradual transfer of control
from the developer to the other unit owners.
Under section 5311.08, the developer may act in place of the
association until it is established.2°  The section requires, how-
ever, that the association be established no later than the time of
the filing of the deed for the first unit sold.210 To avoid any devel-
oper "packing," the section provides that only owners may be
members.21' The association must meet no later than the time
when twenty-five percent of the interests have been sold.21 2 At
that time, the owners other than the developer must elect at least
twenty-five percent of the board of managers. By the time that
fifty percent of the interests have been sold, one-third of the board
203. Rohan, supra note 45, at 1037.
204. Hyatt, supra note 202, at 997.
205. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 170, at 976; Comment, supra note 47, at 455.
206. Note, supra note 52, at 191.
207. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 170, at 976.
208. Rohan, supra note 45, at 1037.
209. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(C) (Page Supp. 1978).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.; "The interests" are the percentage interests in common areas and facilities
appurtenant to each unit as computed under § 5311.04(B). When computing the percent-
ages of interest in expandable condominiums for purposes of determining when 25% of the
interests have been sold, the number of units sold is compared to the maximum number of
units that may be created, as stated in the declaration. Id. § 5311.08(C) (Page Supp. 1978).
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must be elected.2 13
The requirement that the first owners meeting take place no
later than after the sale of twenty-five percent of the interests re-
places the 1963 Act's requirement that the time of the first meeting
need be only specified in the bylaws.2 14 Under this requirement
the initial meeting was commonly held upon notification by the
developer after fifty-one percent unit occupancy.2 1 5 This made
the timing of the initial meeting overly dependent upon the devel-
oper and the complications of condominium marketing and man-
agement.2 6 In view of the conflicting interests between. the
developer and unit owners with respect to the timing of the initial
meeting, the amendments offer a balanced approach by giving
unit owners some voice in their affairs without sacrificing the flex-
ibility needed for the successful development of the condomin-
ium. One state requires the first meeting to be held within 180
days after a certificate of occupancy is issued;21 7 the meeting may
be premature if not enough units have been sold within that time
period. Another approach, suggested by a leading authority, is to
require that the initial meeting be held upon seventy-five percent
owner occupancy.218 This meeting may be too late, depriving the
owners of the experience in condominium management needed to
assure that control is not passed before the owners are ready to
assume it.
Section 5311.08 permits the declaration to authorize the devel-
oper or his designee to appoint and remove the members of the
management board or other association officers and to exercise the
powers otherwise assigned to the association.219 This authoriza-
tion may extend only for three years2 0 after the establishment of
the association or thirty days after the sale of seventy-five percent
of the interests to bona fide purchasers, whichever is earlier.221
The section also provides that if there is a unit owner other than
the developer, the declaration cannot be amended to extend the
213. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(C).
214. Id. § 5311.08(B)(2) (Page 1970). Although this provision did not specifically re-
quire the designation of time requirements for the initial owners meeting, such a require-
ment appears to have fallen within the section's broad language requiring the bylaws to
specify "the time and place for holding" unit owners meetings. Id.
215. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 17.02, at 17-3.
216. Id. § 17.02, at 17-4 to 5.
217. HAw. REv. STAT. § 514A-82(12) (Supp. 1977).
218. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 17.02, at 17-5.
219. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
220. The period is five years for expandable condominiums. Id. § 5311.08(D)(1).
221. Id. § 5311.08(D)(1), .08(D)(2).
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scope or the period of the originally authorized developer control.
This prevents the developer from unilaterally amending the decla-
ration after units have been sold. Within thirty days after the de-
veloper's powers have expired, the association must meet and elect
all of the management board and officers.222 At this time the de-
veloper must turn over the complete and correct records that the
statute requires him to have kept. Failure to do so renders the
developer liable for damages.
223
Ohio's timetable for the transfer of control, based on the per-
centage of units sold and with an outside time limit, is a sound
solution to the problem of prolonged developer control. This ap-
proach encourages a stable transition period in which the owners
can experience condominium management.224 It should be noted,
however, that the three-year limit on developer control extin-
guishes only the developer's extraordinary appointment powers
and the power to act for the association. 22 The amendments per-
mit the developer to retain the usual power of a unit owner in any
unsold units after the three-year period.226 Thus, continued devel-
oper control remains a possibility. An important protection would
be to prohibit the developer from purchasing a certain number of
units as investments for himself 227 or to grant the association an
option to purchase any unsold units after three years.228
Prospective purchasers are further protected by the amend-
ments' disclosure provisions. Presumably, the details of any de-
veloper control must be disclosed to prospective purchasers under
the requirement of section 5311.26 that the written offering state-
ment include significant provisions for management of the condo-
minium development, including the conditions for the formation
of a unit owners association.229 In the event that this section is not
interpreted to require such disclosure in the written statement, a
form of indirect disclosure is still effected by the requirement that
the developer apprise prospective purchasers of their right to re-
view the condominium instruments.230
222. Id. § 5311.08(D).
223. Id. § 5311.09(B).
224. See Hyatt, supra note 202, at 996.
225. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
226. Id. at § 5311.25(F); see id. §§ 5311.05(B)(7), .08(C), .22(A), .25(B).
227. Note, supra note 52, at 197.
228. For a discussion of developer rental of unsold units, see notes 249-68 infra and
accompanying text.
229. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(H)(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
230. Id. § 5311.26(J).
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2. Sweetheart Contracts
Another form of developer self-dealing occurs while the devel-
oper still controls the unit owners association. The developer
causes the association to enter into long-term leases of land or rec-
reational and other facilities or into management and mainte-
nance arrangements with a developer-owned or -controlled
company 31 Developers may also award these arrangements to
third parties in exchange for substantial kickbacks.232 These
agreements, generally known as sweetheart contracts, typically
provide for excessive rents for recreational facilities 3 or for ex-
cessive compensation to the developer for management services.
Since these payments are common expenses, the unit owner suf-
fers injury in the form of higher assessments.234 The cost of these
leases and contracts may be buried in estimated, unitized monthly
maintenance fees. 5 In some situations unit owners may even be
unaware that they do not own the facilities that are being leased to
them .3 6 In addition to the increased cost involved in such con-
tracts, there can be further abuses involved in a leased facilities
arrangement. Developers may reserve rights in the facilities for
themselves or other nonunit owners; furniture may be removed
from recreation areas after the units are sold because it has not
been included in the lease; full rent may be charged for incom-
plete facilities; additional units may be built subsequently without
a comparable increase in the size of recreation areas; or fewer
units may be built than originally anticipated, resulting in in-
creased costs to existing unit owners,.2 37 Management contracts
not only allow the developer to receive excessive compensation for
his services but also permit him to retain control over the daily
231. See Theriot, Louisiana Condominium Act of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1203, 1227
(1975); Note, supra note 48, at 656 n.33; Comment, supra note 20, at 279.
232. Note, supra note 81, at 353.
233. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 24, 1974, at 49 (condominium residents were
paying $311,000 a year to use a pool, leased on a 99-year contract with the developer, that
was valued at $82,000).
234. Comment, supra note 47, at 455.
235. Id. at 455-56.
236. Comment, supra note 20, at 279.
237. See Point E. Management Corp. v. Point E. One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d
628 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974); Riviera Condominium Apartments, Inc.
v. Weinberger, 231 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1970); Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968); Fountainview Ass'n, Inc. v. Bell, 203 So.2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
cert. denied, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968); Note, Long Term Management Contracts Between
Condominium Associations and Developer-Controlled Management Corporations Held Not
Violative of the Florida Condominium Act, 28 U. MLAnI L. REv. 451, 456 (1974).
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affairs of the condominium, giving rise to further opportunities for
self-dealing.
The recent amendments provide some protection against
sweetheart contracts by requiring that the written statement pro-
vided to each prospective purchaser disclose the existence of any
contracts made with the unit owners association.238 To facilitate
this disclosure facsimiles of the contracts must also be provided
along with a narrative statement describing their effect on the
buyer, including the services to be rendered, the charges to be as-
sessed, and the relationship, if any, between the developer and any
managing agent.2 39 The written statement must additionally pro-
vide a two-year projection of the costs of such contracts.2 40
In addition to disclosure, the amendments provide unit owners
with a substantial degree of protection through the requirement
that the recreational and management contracts be renewed by the
unit owners association after the unit owners, other than the de-
veloper, have gained control of the association.241 The section re-
quires the renewal of management contracts one year after the
developer has relinquished control.242 This delayed renewal re-
quirement may represent a legislative recognition of the economic
infeasibility of having legitimate management companies provide
for contract management services where the duration of the man-
agement contract is to be less than one year.
The approach taken by the amendments is commendable since
it retains an option to renew, instead of a strict requirement of
cancellation of all prior management contracts. There are, how-
ever, potential problems that might arise under the amendments.
For example, section 5311.25 pertains only to management con-
238. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(H)(3) (Page Supp. 1978).
239. Id. § 5311.26(I). Virginia protects the purchaser in a similar manner by allowing
the unit owners association to either terminate management contracts without penalty
upon 90 days' written notice or renew them for not more than two years. VA. CODE
§ 55-79.74(b)(1) (Supp. 1978).
240. Section 5311.26(F) requires that the written statement provide a two-year projec-
tion, to be updated at least every six months, of the annual expenditures necessary to oper-
ate and maintain the common areas and facilities. These projections must include an
estimated monthly cost per unit for the two-year period, including the amount of the oper-
ating and maintenance expenses, along with any other costs, fees, and assessments that are
reasonably ascertainable by the developer. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(F) (Page
Supp. 1978). Although it is not explicitly required that they be disclosed, it appears that
this section implicitly covers expenses paid out in compensation for managing the develop-
ment and for leasing recreational and other facilities.
241. Id. § 5311.25(B).
242. Id. § 5311.25(D).
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tracts and fails to require renewal of maintenance and other such
contracts, which may be just as vulnerable to abuse. 43 Further,
under this section, unit owners may remain bound for one year to
a management contract entered into while the developer still con-
trolled the association, even where the contract is unfair or unrea-
sonable. In contrast, the Model Condominium Act does not allow
the developer to enforce a contract after the owners take con-
trol.2' Under the Maryland statute, unit owners may cancel prior
contracts at any time on thirty days' notice.245 Ohio should adopt
a provision, similar to Florida's,2 46 requiring that the contract be
fair and reasonable in order for it to be enforced. This would offer
protection to unit owners during this one-year period without cre-
ating an unacceptable risk to legitimate management companies.
Although the disclosure and renewal provisions of the recent
amendments should be effective against abusive management con-
tracts, they alone will not solve the problems with recreation
leases because the developer actually owns the facilities. The ef-
fectiveness of section 5311.25 could be improved by including
some of the protections suggested by the Florida Condominium
Commission.2 47 These include a requirement that rents be pro-
rated according to the degree of the construction of recreational
facilities, a prohibition against rent escalation clauses in leases,
and a requirement that all leases of recreational facilities contain
an option to purchase at certain intervals that may be exercised by
a vote of seventy-five percent of the unit owners.2 48
3. Developer Rental of Unsold Units
There is the possibility of a considerable lag between the time
the condominium development is ready for occupancy and the
243. Although the disclosure requirement under § 5311.26(1) covers "any management
contract or other agreement affecting the operation, use, or maintenance of or access to all
or any part of the condominium development," § 5311.25(D) applies only to "any manage-
ment contract or agreement executed prior to the assumption of control. ... It is un-
clear why these two sections are not coextensive. A legislative broadening of§ 5311.25(D)
to explicitly cover other contracts may be appropriate.
244. MODEL ACT, supra note 108, at § 15(a), (d).
245. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-125 (Supp. 1977).
246. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.302(10), .302(2) (West Supp. 1978).
247. Amended Report of the Florida Condominium Commission Exhibit B (1973).
248. Id., Exhibit D. These recommendations were eventually enacted by the Florida
legislature. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.401(5), .302(3), .401(2), A01(6)(a)-.401(6)(c)
(West Supp. 1978).
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time every unit is sold.2 4 9 The developer, as owner of these unsold
units,25 0 is required to pay the common expenses251 assessed to
those units, and he may wish to rent them out in order to defray
expenses. The developer may not want to disclose the existence of
rental agreements in order not to discourage sales, and thus subse-
quent unit purchasers may unexpectedly find themselves sur-
rounded by short-term tenants252 or in possession of a previously
rented unit. Developers may also utilize the rental of unsold units
as a means to retain control over the unit owners association. If
there is rental income sufficient to defray costs, the developer may
indefinitely retain enough units to effectively control the associa-
tion and board253 by voting the interests of the unsold units.2 54
The recent amendments contemplate that the developer will
retain the unsold units255 and provide that he must assume the
rights and obligations of a unit owner. 6 One weakness in the
amended statute is the absence of a specific requirement that de-
velopers disclose to prospective purchasers whether unsold units
have been or are being rented. 57 The rental of unsold units may
arguably constitute "a material circumstance or feature affecting
the development, 2 58 thus requiring disclosure of any intent to
rent or the actual rental of units by the developer. A better ap-
proach, which avoids judicial resolution of this issue, would be the
adoption of a specific statutory provision requiring that disclo-
sure.
2 5 9
249. Clothier, The Great Condominium Mania, 79 CASE AND COMMENT (no. 5) 3, 8
(1974).
250. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
251. Id. §§ 5311.04(F), .25(F).
252. Note, supra note 43, at 327-28.
253. Clothier, supra note 249, at 8.
254. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.05(B)(7), .08(C), .22(A), .25 (Page Supp.
1978).
255. See id. § 5311.25(B), .25(F).
256. Id. § 5311.25(F).
257. Such a policy is not covered by the disclosure requirements for conversion condo-
miniums, see id. § 5311.26(G), because by definition a "conversion condominium" involves
a whole development originally operated as a rental property prior to the time the condo-
minium property was submitted to chapter 5311, see id. § 5311.01(X).
258. OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26 (Page Supp. 1978). See note 63 supra and ac-
companying text.
259. Florida has such a disclosure requirement. The developer's prospectus must in-
clude:
A statement of whether the developer's plan includes a program of leasing
units rather than selling them, or leasing units and selling them subject to such
leases. If so, there shall be a description of the plan, including the number and
identification of the units and the provisions and term of the proposed leases, and
Vol. 29:147
CONDOMINIUM L4W REFORM
It has been suggested that developers should also be prohibited
from renting unsold units pending sale without the approval of a
substantial majority of the owners in occupancy.260 One Ohio de-
veloper has proposed that the practice be prohibited unless the
owner is an actual resident within the condominium develop-
ment.261 These limitations, however, would necessarily increase
development costs, 262 which ultimately would be passed to subse-
quent purchasers. Thus, it is submitted that developers should be
permitted to rent unsold units, provided that prospective purchas-
ers are fully informed of this possibility.
As previously noted, by withholding units from sale it is possi-
ble for a developer to retain control over the unit owners associa-
tion and the board of managers indefinitely.263 Although section
5311.08 contemplates the transfer of control from the developer to
the other unit owners by establishing a three-year limit on the de-
veloper's authority to exercise the powers of the association,264 the
developer can defeat this by retaining ownership of enough units
to assure himself effective voting control. To avoid this, it is sug-
gested that the association be statutorily granted an option to
purchase any of the unsold units for fair value after a certain pe-
riod of time, exercisable by a substantial majority of the unit own-
ers other than the developer. For example, if the unit owners
association had an option after three years265 to purchase any un-
sold units at fair value, exercisable within ninety days266 by a vote
a statement in boldface type that: THE UNITS MAY BE TRANSFERRED
SUBJECT TO A LEASE.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.504(10) (West Supp. 1978).
260. The New York Council of Condominiums has recommended that developers be
prohibited from renting unsold units unless 75% of the owners in occupancy give their
approval. Rohan, supra note 45, at 1033.
261. Letter from John F. Brooks, Executive Vice President, Hilltop Management Co. to
the House Judiciary Subcommitee, Hearings on H.B. 404, Recommendation 11 (June 28,
1977).
262. This point was recognized by the New York Council of Condominiums. Rohan,
supra note 45, at 1033.
263. See notes 253-54 supra and accompanying text. By retaining such control, the
developer is free to continue abusive self-dealing practices. For example, he would be able
to circumvent the renewal requirements for sweetheart contracts. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5311.25(B), .25(D) (Page Supp. 1978). For a discussion of sweetheart contracts, see
notes 231-48 supra and accompanying text.
264. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(D)(l) (Page Supp. 1978).
265. Id. § 5311.08(D)(9) requires that after three years the developer have no interest in
the development other than to sell remaining units.
266. Ninety days would be an adequate amount of time for the association to reach a
decision about the purchase of units without unreasonable delay to the developer.
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of seventy-five percent of the voting interests, excluding the devel-
oper's, such indefinite control could be avoided.
This approach would balance the legitimate interests of a de-
veloper in an unfinished project against the interests of the unit
owners in gaining complete control of their association. After
three years, the units and common areas of the project should be
established, leaving the developer with no concern other than sell-
ing any remaining units.2 67 Such an option would not preclude
the necessity of disclosure since prospective buyers will still need
to know what the developer's rental policy is in order to make an
informed purchase decision. Rather, the option should be in addi-
tion to the required disclosure, allowing owners to change rental
policy after enough time has lapsed so that the developer no
longer has an interest in "developing" the condominium.268
III. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
A. Rights and Obligations of Unit Owners Inter Se
The rights and obligations of unit owners to each other involve
two major areas: (1) issues relative to the common areas and (2)
issues regarding the internal governance of the condominium de-
velopment. Because the allocation of interest in the common ar-
eas frequently determines each unit owner's voting strength in
matters of internal governance, that subject is discussed first.
1. Common Areas
Ownership of a condominium is both individual and collec-
tive. It is individual because a condominium owner has exclusive
fee simple ownership of his individual unit; it is collective because
the owner also has an undivided interest as a tenant in common in
the common areas and facilities,26 9 which is inseparable from the
unit interest.270 The common areas, which cannot be parti-
tioned,27 include the land, foundations, roofs, halls, gardens, ele-
267. The association should not be required to purchase units on an all-or-nothing ba-
sis. Some owners may wish to purchase only a number of units sufficient to take majority
control away from the developer.
268. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.25(B), .25(D), .26(H)(3), .26(1) (Page
Supp. 1978), which require the developer to disclose the existence and terms of sweetheart
contracts and give owners the right to refuse renewal of such contracts after control of the
association has passed from the developer.
269. See Note, Living in a Condominium Individual Need Versus Community Interests,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 523 (1977).
270. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.04(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
271. Id. § 5311.04(A).
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vators, and other areas which are not part of any unit.2 72 The
common areas and facilities are maintained by an association of
unit owners from which a board of managers is selected. Each
unit is assessed, on the basis of its percentage share of the common
areas, to cover the expenses of maintaining the common areas. As
has been noted, "what gives rise to problems in condominium
ownership. . are the practical questions arising from the neces-
sity of common elements. ... 271 Several issues involving com-
mon areas warrant examination.
a. Assignment ofInterest. The first problem presented is the
method of allocating each owner's interest in the common areas.
The allocation determines each unit owner's voting rights, the
amount that he will receive in the event of the condominium's sale
or condemnation, the amount that he will be assessed to cover the
expense of maintaining the common areas,2 74 and the interest in
the common areas deemed conveyed upon sale.275 State enabling
acts utilize various formulas for computing a unit owner's share in
the common areas. The most common formula, which was used
in Ohio before the recent amendments, establishes the owner's
share in the proportion that the fair value of his individual unit
bears to the aggregate fair value of all the units.276  Another
widely used formula provides that the owner's interest must ap-
proximate the ratio of the floor area of his individual unit to the
aggregate floor area of all the units.277 A few jurisdictions use
other methods of determining the share of a unit owner in the
common areas.278 Some states, for example, provide that the
value of the interest in common areas is simply the value desig-
272. Id. § 5311.01(B). In addition, provision may be made for limited common areas,
which are those areas reserved exclusively for a certain unit or units. Id. § 5311.01(K).
273. Kreider, The Ohio Condominium.dct, 33 U. CIN. L. REv. 463, 464 (1964).
274. For a definition of common areas, see text accompanying note 272 supra.
275. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners
Association, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1104, 1116-17 (1969). OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.04
(D) (Page Supp. 1978) provides that:
The undivided interest in the common areas and facilities shall not be separated
from the unit to which it appertains and shall be deemed conveyed or encum-
bered with the unit even though such interest is not expressly mentioned or de-
scribed in the deed, mortgage, lease or other instrument of conveyance or
encumbrance.
276. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.04(B) (Page Supp. 1978); FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION, MODEL STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF APARTMENT OWNERSHIP
§ 6(a), reprinted in IA P. RoHAN & M. REsIN, supra note 22, app. B-3, at 27 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as FHA MODEL ACT].
277. See, eg., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-i(l),-ii,-iv (McKinney Supp. 1978).
278. See Note, supra note 269, at 526.
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nated in the declaration 279 or that the unit owners are deemed to
have equal shares unless otherwise provided for in the condomin-
ium instruments. 280 A few states have made no provision dealing
with common area ownership at all.281
Often the allocation must be made at the time the declaration
is filed and cannot be changed without unanimous approval of all
affected owners.282 This was the Ohio approach prior to the re-
cent amendments. 83 This combination of strict requirements
concerning when interests may be created and how they can be
changed creates restrictions on valuation that defeat the premise
upon which the fair value formula is based and create unfairness
both to the developer and the purchaser. Because fair market
value usually must be determined at the time the declaration is
filed 84 and may not be changed without the unanimous approval
of all affected unit owners,285 such statutory schemes fail to take
account of later fluctuations in the value of units caused by infla-
tion or improvements by unit owners.286 The developer also is
restricted in offering different options or increasing the size of the
development because of his earlier commitment to specific interest
allocations.287 The owner who later pays more for his unit than
earlier purchasers of comparable units or who makes extensive
improvements on his unit may be at a disadvantage when insur-
ance or condemnation proceeds are distributed, but he may come
out ahead when costs are assessed.288
279. See I P. RouAN & M. RESIN, supra note 22, § 6.01[3], at 6-5 n.13.
280. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353(b) (West Supp. 1978).
281. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 6.0113], at 6-5 n.13.
282. Schreiber, supra note 275, at 1117.
283. Several provisions in the previous Ohio Act combined to create strict requirements
about when the interests had to be established and how they could be changed. Section
5311.02 of the original Ohio Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.02 (Page 1970), provided
that the Condominium Act applied only to property specifically submitted to its provisions
by execution and filing of a declaration by the owner. Section 5311.06(C) added that no
interest in a unit could be conveyed until the declaration, bylaws, and drawings had been
filed. Hence, a condominium developer had to file the declaration at an early point during
the life of the development. In addition, § 5311.04(B) provided that the percentage of in-
terest in common areas had to be made at that early point as well. Furthermore, once the
interests were determined and the declaration was filed, § 5311.04(C) provided that the
interest could not be altered except by unanimous approval of all the unit owners affected.
284. Schreiber, supra note 275, at 1117.
285. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 6.01[3], at 6-4.
286. See id. § 13.02[I][c], at 13-6; Schreiber, supra note 275, at 1117-18.
287. 1 P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 22, § 13.02[1][c], at 13-6; Schreiber, supra
note 275, at 1120.
288. One solution would require periodic reassessment. Schreiber, supra note 275, at
1119. This could prove impractical if done too often. I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra
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The recent amendments attempt to alleviate the problems
presented by the fair-value-at-the-date-of-declaration formula
without requiring periodic reassessment. Under amended section
5311.04,289 the developer of a nonexpandable condominium is
given additional flexibility in allocating percentages of interest in
the common areas. The section retains the fair value ratio as an
alternative but also permits common area percentages to be com-
puted on the basis of unit size or on par value. Par value is de-
fined as a "number expressed in dollars or points attached to a
unit by a declaration."290 If a par value is assigned to one unit, it
must be assigned to all. Substantially identical units must have
the same par value. Units located at substantially different heights
or with substantially different views, amenities, or other character-
istics which might affect market value can, but do not have to, be
considered substantially identical. Par value need not reflect sale
price, fair market value, or appraised value.29" ' Par value may not
be used, however, to determine the common area interests in ex-
pandable condominiums unless the declaration requires addi-
tional units to be identical to the original units or unless the
declaration describes the type of units that may be added and
states the par value that will be assigned to new units.292 Other-
wise, any basis may be used for additional units that was used for
the original property if it uniformly reallocates the interests of the
original units when additional property is submitted.
The section does retain the requirements that the fair market
value of the units must be determined on the date of filing the
declaration and cannot be altered without the unanimous ap-
proval of all affected unit owners. Although the alternative meth-
ods of allocating interest in the common areas may alleviate this
problem somewhat, problems remain with assigning a par value
or determining size before the developer is accurately able to do
so and retaining that determination to the subsequent disadvan-
note 22, § 6.0114], at 6-7 n.20. Changing common interests at certain intervals could affect
the mortgageability of units and could create frequent realty tax "assessments". Schreiber,
supra note 275, at 1119. Contra 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 6.01[4], at 6-7.
Only two states currently allow or require periodic assessment. ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.07.180(b) (1962) (bylaws shall provide for periodic reappraisal); WASH. Rav. CODE
ANN. § 64.32.050(2) (1966) (interests in common areas may not be changed except by
utilizing procedures in the bylaws and by amending the declaration).
289. OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 5311.04(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
290. Id. § 5311.01(Y).
291. Id. § 5311.04(B).
292. Id. § 5311.04(C).
19781
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA4W REVIEW [o2
tage of unit owners. It is unclear under the section whether the
size and par value must be determined by the time the declaration
is filed; the section speaks of only the fair market value in terms of
the date of filing.293 However, since section 5311.05 requires that
the declaration describe the percentage of interest appertaining to
each unit, the basis of allocation,294 and each unit's approximate
area,2 95 it is clear that the unit size and par value must be deter-
mined by the date of filing the declaration.
To some extent, the problems of early determination are mini-
mized where unit size and par value are involved. Normally unit
size is determinable before value, and when par value is used, fair
market value need not be reflected. However, certain problems
persist, particularly when the par value method is employed.
When allocating interests in the common areas, the developer
must attempt to assign the same par value to "substantially identi-
cal" units; what characteristics comprise par value is left to the
developer's discretion. It is submitted that the power of discretion
granted to the developer drains all meaning from the requirement
that the same par value be assigned to substantially identical
units. Furthermore, practical inequities among unit owners result
where units are assigned the same par value even though their
market values are unequal. Two owners may have identical vot-
ing rights and receive the same amount of liquidation proceeds
even though one paid more for his unit. The same inequity will
result in the situation of an owner who has made improvements
on his unit that increased its value or who buys after the sale price
has risen. As useful as these more flexible methods may seem,
they are preferable only as long as the unit owner's interest ap-
proximates the value of his investment.
b. Collection of Common Expenses and 4ssessments. The
success of a condominium project depends upon the board's or
association's ability to collect from the unit owners money that
will maintain common areas and provide other benefits for special
or common purposes.2 96 A unit owner's proportionate interest in
the common areas typically determines the amount of his assess-
ment for common expenses. If a unit owner cannot or will not pay
293. Id. § 5311.04(B).
294. Id. § 5311.05(B)(6).
295. Id. § 5311.05(B)(5).
296. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987,
1010 (1963); Theriot, supra note 231, at 1221.
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his share of the common costs, the law must determine what
method of inducement is best and also what should happen when
a unit is sold by an owner who has an outstanding debt for com-
mon expenses. Under some statutes the association or board may
bring a personal action to collect the assessment. The board usu-
ally is also empowered by statute to impose a lien on the delin-
quent owner's unit and interest in the common areas. This is
generally considered to be the most effective remedy.297 Summary
dispossession is inconsistent with the fee status of condominium
ownership,298 and extrajudicial remedies299 are effective only
against those owners who are late in their payments, not against
those who steadfastly refuse to pay.3°
The FHA Model Act and the majority of states, including
Ohio, employ the lien technique. The unpaid expenses constitute
a lien upon the unit, prior to all but certain designated liens.30'
Such a lien may be foreclosed and the unit and common area in-
terest sold.3°2 However, the time period necessary to accomplish
foreclosure may be substantial; meanwhile, the burden of extra
expenses is placed on the other unit owners.30 3 A minority of
states3°4 use the trust and lien-upon-sale technique. Upon the sale
of the condominium interest all unpaid expenses are first paid out
of the sale price or by the purchaser of the unit.305 A trust is im-
posed upon the seller for the amount of unpaid assessments, and
the association is usually given a cause of action against the buyer
for a money judgment that is enforceable as a lien against the
unit.3°  As mentioned, the association's lien may have priority
over all but certain other liens specified in the statute, typically tax
297. Theriot, supra note 231, at 1221.
298. Berger, supra note 296, at 1011.
299. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.220 (1975) (permitting utilities to be severed after 10
days' notice); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.32.200 (1)(a) (1966).
300. 1 P. RoRAN & M. REKIN, supra note 22, § 6.0411], at 6-25.
301. FHA MODEL AcT, supra note 276, §23(a); accord, HAw. REv. STAT.
§514A-90(A) (Supp. 1977); states cited in 1 P. RoHAN & M. REsKN, supra note 22,
§ 6.04[2] at 6-25 to 26 n.6; OHo REv. CODE ANN § 5311.18 (Page 1970). Contra, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 309 (Smith-Hurd 1969), discussed in note 307 infra.
302. 1 P. RoH~A & M. REsKiN, supra note 22, § 6.04[2], at 6-26 to 27.
303. Id. at 6-28.
304. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-2 (MeKinney Cum. Supp. 1978).
305. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RF.sKIN, supra note 22, § 6.0412][b], at 6-28.
306. Id. at 6-28 to 29. This procedure allows a delinquent to live in a unit without
paying assessments, mortgage the unit to almost its full value, and then sell it for the value
of whatever small equity remains. Gregory, The Caifornia Condominium Bill, 14 HAS-
TINGs L. 189, 204 n.31 (1963), see, ag., FHA MODEL AcT, supra note 276, § 23(a).
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liens and the first mortgages of record.3 °7 While beneficial to the
association, the lien technique may present problems for the in-
dividual unit owner since secondary borrowing is discouraged,
harsher terms are imposed on subordinated loans, and financing
for home improvements may become more difficult because
mechanic's and materialman's liens are subordinated.30 8
Section 5311.18,309 left relatively unaltered by the recent
amendments, authorizes the unit owners association to have a lien
on the interest in the unit and appurtenant common area of any
unit owner who has failed to pay his portion of the common ex-
penses for ten days after they become due, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the declaration or bylaws. A certificate must be filed with
the county recorder, pursuant to authorization given by the board
of managers. This certificate must contain a description of the
unit, the name of the record owner, and the amount of the unpaid
portion of common expenses, and it must be subscribed by the
chief officer of the association. The lien remains valid for five
years unless released, satisfied, or discharged before that time.
The section also gives priority to such a lien over any subse-
quently created encumbrance, except real estate tax and assess-
ment liens and liens of first mortgages of record. Liens obtained
under section 5311.18 may be foreclosed, as is a mortgage on real
property, by an action brought on behalf of the association by the
chief officer so authorized by the board. During a foreclosure ac-
tion the owner must pay reasonable rent for his unit, and a re-
ceiver may be appointed to collect it. The association, if
authorized by the board, may become a purchaser at the sale, un-
less prohibited by the declaration or bylaws.3 10 In addition, sec-
tion 5311.23 allows greater flexibility in the collection of common
expenses by permitting the association to sue for damages to re-
cover unpaid assessments.311 The delinquent owner, under sec-
tion 5311.18, has a ten-day grace period and an action to
307. See, e.g., FHA MODEL AcT, supra note 276, § 23(a); HAW. REv. STAT. §
514A-90(A) (Supp. 1977). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 309 (Smith-Hurd 1969), where
if the board sends the mortgagee notice of the owner's default, the mortgage is subject to
liens due within 90 days. The mortgagee may pay the delinquent expenses and have the
lien on the unit rank equal to his mortgage.
308. Berger, supra note 296, at 1011.
309. OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.18 (Page Supp. 1978).
310. Id. § 5311.18(B).
311. Id. § 5311.23.
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discharge the lien if he feels it has been improperly imposed.3 12
Thus Ohio law strikes a balance between the interests of the unit
owner and the association.
The Ohio statute, however, remains silent in two significant
areas. First, additional changes could be made in the statute to
improve the association's position when it attempts to impose a
lien. The board or association should have the power to sell, as
provided in California,313 and to charge interest on the amount
due, as provided in Georgia.314 Second, the statute is also silent
on the liability of grantees who purchase a unit with unpaid as-
sessments either at a voluntary or involuntary sale.315 Since the
association is required to file a certificate of the lien, grantees are
312. Id. § 5311.18(C). The court may discharge all or part of an improperly imposed
lien. Id.
313. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1356 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
314. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1641e(b) (1978). Some statutes explicitly authorize the unit
owners association to sue for money damages without waiving the right to its lien. See,
ag., FHA MODEL ACT, supra note 276, § 23(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(5)(a) (West
Supp. 1978). In Ohio it has been held that where a new remedy is provided by statute for
an existing common law right, it is cumulative (unless denied expressly or by implication),
and the plaintiffmay pursue either the statutory or common law remedy. Phillips Sheet &
Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, 98 Ohio St. 73, 120 N.E. 207 (1918). Under OHIO R. Civ. P.
8(E)(2), a party may set forth two or more claims in the alternative, and may state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has, regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or equitable grounds. Thus, the association could plead the damages claim and lien simul-
taneously; once the case came to judgment, the association would have to elect which rem-
edy to enforce. See 98 Ohio St. 73, 120 N.E. 207. Ohio ease law has also held that alienor
does not waive his right to foreclose the lien by obtaining a judgment and levying on the
property. Sun Fin. & Loan Co. v. Hadlock, 171 Ohio St. 89, 167 N.E.2d 780 (1960); Econ-
omy Say. & Loan Co. v. Lindsey, 96 Ohio App. 400, 122 N.E.2d 36 (10th Dist. 1954). If the
association prevailed on the damages claim, it could not thereafter foreclose the lien; if,
however, the unit owner prevailed or the association's recovery was for less than the full
amount of the lien, the association could then maintain an action based on the lien. See
Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943). Thus, a provision explicitly
authorizing suit for damages without waiving a foreclosure action, as provided in Florida
and the FHA Model Act, does not appear necessary in Ohio.
315. Whichever lien technique is used, in most states the grantor and grantee upon a
voluntary sale are held jointly and severally liable for remaining unpaid assessments, and
the grantee is given a right to proceed against the grantor for any amount paid. 1 P.
ROHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 22, § 6.04[3], at 6-31; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 718.116(1) (West Supp. 1978). In the case of foreclosure, however, many states do not
hold the first mortgagee or other purchaser solely liable for unpaid assessments. Rather,
the assessments become common expenses. FHA MODEL ACT, supra note 276, § 23(b);
see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(b) (West Supp. 1978). This distinction between vol-
untary and involuntary sales is meant to encourage financing, even at the association's
expense. Note, The Alabama Condominium Ownership Act: How to Standa House Divided,
27 ALA. L. REv. 177, 202 (1975). A problem may arise either if the association refuses to
pay to the former owner any excess from the proceeds over what was owed or, more com-
monly, if the association and owner disagree on the amount owed to the owner after costs
and charges. I P. RoH & M. REsIGN, supra note 22, § 6.04[3], at 6-36.
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provided notice of the lien,3 6 and it, therefore, would not be ineq-
uitable to hold them liable for the unpaid assessments. The liabil-
ity of purchasers at a foreclosure sale would seem to depend upon
whether the mortgage being foreclosed was superior to the associ-
ation's lien.317 The Ohio statute should answer these issues explic-
itly. The legislature might also adopt a provision found in some
statutes that gives the owner, purchaser, and lienors the right to
request from the association information regarding the amount of
unpaid assessments and then binds the association to the amount
it reports.31
2. Internal Governance
Although the recent amendments leave the 1963 Act's provi-
sions regarding condominium internal governance and adminis-
tration relatively unaltered, 319 the structure and method of
condominium governance is nevertheless a fundamental aspect of
condominium ownership which deserves analysis. Three areas
warrant specific attention: (1) condominium governance structure,
(2) unit use and alienation restrictions, and (3) removal of the con-
dominium from the operation of the statute.
a. Condominium Governance Structure. As provided by
statute in all states, the unit owners association bears the primary
responsibility for the administration and management of the con-
dominium. 320 State condominium enabling acts typically provide
that the declaration require that each unit owner be a member of
the association.3 21 The association is governed by the bylaws,
which is essentially a code of operating rules and regulations.322
The association plays a dual role as business and finance manager
316. Some state statutes provide that recording of the declaration constitutes record
notice of the lien. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1641e(a) (1978); UNIFORM CONDOMIN-
IUM AcT, § 3-115(c), reprinted in 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 6.05, at 6-37.
317. If the mortgage is superior to the lien for common expenses, foreclosure should cut
off the common expenses lien. Zinman, Condominium Investments and the Institutional
Lender-A Review, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 749, 753 (1974).
318. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 35, § 35-8-17(2) (1975).
319. The amendments do, however, add detailed requirements for the establishment of
the unit owners association and the relinquishment of developer control of the association
to unit owners. See notes 197-230 supra and accompanying text.
320. See I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 5.04, at 5-21; Hyatt, supra note
202, at 978.
321. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.05(B)(7) (Page Supp. 1978).
322. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, §§ 3.03, 7.03[1], .03[2]; see, e.g., OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
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of the development and as a minigovernment dealing with public
safety, assessments, rulemaking, and enforcement. The associa-
tion's power to regulate the use and enjoyment of property has
constitutional implications, requiring at least a minimal obser-
vance of the dictates of due process.323 The association typically
delegates its management authority to a board of managers
elected by the unit owners as members of the association.324 The
major function of the board is the enforcement of the bylaws and
any administrative rules that are adopted. The board, in turn,
elects officers and may establish standing committees to help run
the development and hire professional advisors such as an ac-
countant, attorney, or professional agent to manage the prop-
erty.
325
i. Bylaw Provisions. Section 5311.08 of the Ohio Act out-
lines the condominium's governance structure and the contents of
the bylaws.326 The section requires the establishment of a unit
owners association to be governed by the bylaws and stipulates
that any amendments to the bylaws must be set forth in an
amendment to the declaration.327 Unless the declaration indicates
otherwise, the bylaws must provide for the election of a board of
managers 328 and its officers. 329 The bylaws must also delineate the
powers of the board330 and set out procedures for calling and con-
ducting the owners association meetings, 33' authorizing and per-
forming repairs of the common areas, 332 assessing and collecting
common expenses,333 distributing common profits,334 and adopt-
323. Hyatt, supra note 202, at 982-84.
324. See, eg., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
325. Hennessy, Condominium Management, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1064, 1068 (1974);
see 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, §§ 17A.02-.03.
326. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08 (Page Supp. 1978).
327. Id. § 5311.08(A).
328. Id. § 5311.08(B)(1).
329. Id. § 5311.08(B)(3).
330. Id. § 5311.08(B)(1).
331. Id. § 5311.08(B)(2). This includes the establishment of a quorum requirement.
See text accompanying notes 338-39 infra.
332. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1978).
333. Id. § 5311.08(B)(5).
334. Id. § 5311.08(B)(6). Common profits is defined as:
The amount by which the total income received from assessments charged for
special benefits to specific units, rents received from rentals of equipment or space
in common areas, and any other fee, charge or income other than common assess-
ment exceeds expenses allocable to the income, rental, fee, or charge.
Id. § 5311.01(G().
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ing administrative rules.335 Despite the numerous items required
to be in the bylaws, the Ohio statute still accords the unit owners
considerable flexibility in determining the actual details of admin-
istration. Given the varying sizes, nature, and needs of condomin-
iums, this flexibility is necessary.
Another element which must be included in the bylaws is a
quorum requirement, expressed in terms of percentage of interest
in the common areas, for meetings of the owners association.336
The quorum requirement is included in the bylaw provisions 337 to
protect against a minority of unit owners making decisions ad-
verse to majority interests. Ohio, like many states,338 allows the
association to determine what percentage will constitute a quo-
rum. In contrast, the enabling acts of several states specify a per-
centage, usually a majority.339 The drawback of a statutory
quorum requirement is that in a larger condominium obtaining a
quorum for routine meetings may be difficult, if not impossible.34 °
Thus, the flexible Ohio provision is a more suitable approach.
The statute's general disclosure provisions341 should be ex-
tended to include the bylaws in order to improve the position of
prospective purchasers. Although the recent amendments require
the developer to disclose information regarding the management
of the development,342 they do not require the developer,343 the
governing board, or unit owners to provide prospective purchasers
with copies of the declaration, bylaws, or administrative rules. 3 "
Since the Act's general disclosure requirements do not include all
the information covered in the bylaws, an explicit requirement
would help both initial and subsequent unit purchasers. Full dis-
closure of the bylaws is important also because a unit owner is
potentially liable for damages caused by noncompliance with the
335. Id. § 5311.08(B)(7).
336. Id. § 5311.08(B)(2).
337. See generally 1 P. ROHAN & M. REsKtN, supra note 22, § 5.04.
338. See states cited in id. § 5.04, at 5-22 n.5.
339. See states cited in id. § 5.04, at 5-22 to 23 n.6.
340. See id. § 5.04, at 5-24.
341. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26 (Page Supp. 1978). See notes 326-35 supra and
accompanying text.
342. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(H) (Page Supp. 1978).
343. The recent amendments do, however, require that the offering statement apprise
prospective purchasers of their right to review the condominium instruments. Id.
§ 5311.26(J).
344. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360 (West Supp. 1978) (requiring the governing
body or the owners of a unit to provide prospective purchasers with these documents on
request and allowing an action for actual damages and punitive damages of up to $500 plus
attorneys' fees upon failure to do so).
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bylaws. 345
ii. Powers and Duties of Directors and Officers. Any discus-
sion of condominium governance necessarily involves a consider-
ation of the powers and duties of the board of managers
(directors) and its officers, who manage the condominium for the
unit owners. Questions can arise regarding what functions the
board or its officers may be empowered to perform and what the
standard of liability for nonperformance of duties should be.
Section 5311.08 of the Ohio Act is the source of the board of
managers' power. It requires that the bylaws provide for the an-
nual election of one-third of the board members from among the
membership and specifies that the board is empowered to act for
the association unless the declaration or bylaws provide other-
wise.3 46 The section further requires that the bylaws state the
board's powers and duties, the compensation for board members,
the method for their removal, and the rules for hiring a profes-
sional manager or managing agent.347 The bylaws also must pro-
vide for the election by the board of a president, one or more vice
presidents, a secretary, a treasurer, and any other officers of the
association.348
While the propriety of various actions taken by condominium
boards has been adjudicated in other jurisdictions, 349 the power of
a board to engage in certain transactions, such as borrowing
money, remains unclear.350 A possible legislative solution to this
uncertainty would be to enumerate specifically board powers.
Such a restrictive approach, however, could render the board in-
capable of responding to unforeseen problems. Since managerial
345. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.23 (Page Supp. 1978).
346. Id. § 5311.08(B)(1).
347. Id.
348. Id. § 5311.08(B)(3).
349. See, eg., Hidden Harbor Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (upholding right of directors to adopt a rule prohibiting the use of alcoholic
beverages in the condominium clubhouse); Vinik v. Taylor, 270 So. 2d 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (upholding right of board of managers to approve an alteration of a unit own-
er's balcony); Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971) (requiring unit owner to restore an al-
tered portion of the unit's exterior to its original condition); Amoruso v. Board of Managers
of Westchester Hills Condominium, 38 App. Div. 845, 330 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1972) (approving
expenditure of $500 by board of managers when bylaws provided that additions costing
less than $5,000 need not be approved by unit owners). See also Note, supra note 269, at
525 nn.17-19.
350. 1 P. RoHNi & M. RasKiN, supra note 22, § 17A.13; see Hyatt & Rhoads, supra
note 170, at 920 n.17.
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flexibility is necessary to the vitality of a condominium, restrictive
legislation seems undesirable.
There is currently some debate over whether unit owners as-
sociations should be incorporated.35' Some state statutes have re-
solved this by specifically requiring the incorporation of the
owners association,352 bringing the established body of corporate
law to condominium management. Although the Ohio condomin-
ium statute remains silent on the subject of incorporation, presum-
ably the owners association may incorporate as either an ordinary
or a nonprofit corporation. The recent amendments fail to include
an express provision that the association may incorporate. A
mandatory requirement of incorporation is, however, not neces-
sary in order to define the duties of the association's directors.
Commentators have been disposed toward imposing fiduciary du-
ties upon the directors, officers, and managers of unincorporated
associations. 3  However, since Ohio case law is silent on the sub-
ject, a legislative basis for imposing a fiduciary obligation upon
'the managers of the association would be appropriate.
Although it may be permissible to impose legislatively a
fiduciary duty upon the association's directors and officers, any
further delineation of duties in the enabling act would not be de-
sirable. As in defining the board's power,354 it is difficult to con-
ceive of a statutory scheme that would specify all the duties of
directors and officers but that would not severely limit the func-
tioning of the board. Abusive exercise of power by directors and
officers could be curbed through the adoption of a provision simi-
lar to Hawaii's, which prohibits a director who has a conflict of
interest from voting. 55 It has also been suggested that the devel-
351. See, e.g., Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 170, at 919-20; Note, Condominiums. Incor-
poration ofthe Common Elements-A Proposal, 23 VAND. L. REV. 321 (1970).
In Ohio the unincorporated condominium association is analogous to an unincorpo-
rated association since § 5311.08 provides that the management responsibility rests with the
owners association. Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1978)
with id §§ 1745.01-.04 (Page 1964 & Supp. 1977) (unincorporated association). This
responsibility may in turn be delegated to the board and its officers. See generally Miazga
v. International Union, 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 205 N.E.2d 884 (1965); McFadden v. Leeka, 48
Ohio St. 513, 28 N.E. 874 (1891); Thraves v. White City Beach Ass'n, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 661
(6th Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
352. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §718.111(1) (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 85-1632e(a) (1978).
353. H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS
§ 40, at 85 (3d ed. 1974), citedin Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 170, at 921 n.25.
354. See text accompanying notes 349-50 supra.
355. HAW. REv. STAT. § 514A-82(14) (Supp. 1977). The statute prohibits any person
employed in a management capacity from serving on the board. Id. § 514A-82(15).
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oper be prohibited from serving on the board or being employed
in a managerial capacity.356 This would deny unit owners the
benefit of the developer's managerial expertise. As a protection
against potential developer abuse, this restriction is too broad; a
narrower prohibition against voting on issues in which a conflict
of interest exists would furnish a better solution.
iii. Voting Rights. The most important voting right of each
unit owner is the right to vote for the association's board of man-
agers.35 7 There are also voting rights for matters not within the
ambit of day-to-day management. Thus, a unit owner may vote
on any proposed amendments to the declaration,358 any proposed
reallocation of the percentages of interest in the common areas,
359
repair of damaged common areas and facilities, 360 rehabilitation
of the property,361 and removal of the property from the operation
of the condominium act.362
The Ohio Act imposes voting percentages that become pro-
gressively stricter as the type of action requiring a vote becomes
more extraordinary. For example, a decision to rehabilitate con-
dominium property363 or to amend the declaration or bylaws
364
requires at least seventy-five percent approval; a change in the
percentage of interest in the common areas requires unanimous
approval.365 The recent statutory amendments do not alter this
approach, but they do clarify that amendments to the declaration
which alter percentage interests in common areas must receive
unanimous approval.366
356. Rohan, supra note 45, at 1038.
357. See OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
Section 5311.08 does not require that the manner in which voting rights are apportioned
among the unit owners be specified in the bylaws. The contention, however, that Ohio's
enabling act does not specify how voting rights are to be determined, 1 P. ROHAN & M.
REsKIN, supra note 22, § 5.04, at 5-25, is not entirely accurate. Unless otherwise provided
in the declaration, § 5311.22 establishes the voting power of each unit owner as his percent-
age of interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to his unit.
358. OHIo REv. CODE A'N. § 5311.05(B)(9) (Page Supp. 1978).
359. Id. § 5311.04(D).
360. Id. § 5311.14(B) (Page 1970).
361. Id. § 5311.15.
362. Id. § 5311.17.
363. Id. § 5311.15.
364. Id. § 5311.05(B)(9) (Page Supp. 1978).
365. Id. § 5311.04(D); accord, Grimes v. Moreland, 41 Ohio Misc. 69, 322 N.E.2d 699
(C.P. Franklin County 1974).
366. OHio REv. CODE Am. §§ 5311.04(D), .05(B)(9) (Page Supp. 1978).
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Most jurisdictions have adopted this general approach.36 7 The
statutes frequently let the bylaws of the individual condominium
determine the details about voting rights in director elections.368
This flexible approach, as in the Ohio statute, will foster the
smooth operation of the condominium and thus protect the unit
owners' investments. 69
b. Unit Use andAlienation Restrictions. The condominium
form of ownership generally entails a situation in which many
people must live in proximity to one another. Thus, there is a
need for certain restrictions on unit use and alienation that will
ensure a peaceful existence among neighbors and yet still remain
consistent with fee simple ownership.
i. Use Restrictions. The majority of state enabling statutes
provide that the declaration, deeds, and bylaws, as well as any
administrative rules and regulations promulgated by the board,
may contain restrictions on the use of particular units or the com-
mon areas.370 Use restrictions typically include the prohibition of
annoying or nuisance-creating activities; the regulation or prohibi-
tion of pets, alcoholic beverages, or children; and limitations on
alterations or modifications of the interior or exterior of units.37 '
The major problems presented by use restrictions pertain to their
validity and enforcement.
Section 5311.19 of the Ohio Act requires the unit owners, their
tenants, and all those in possession and control of any part of the
condominium property to comply with the restrictions and cove-
nants in the deed, declaration, and bylaws and with any adminis-
trative rules that are adopted.372 An action for damages or
367. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.110(4) (West Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
30, § 304(c) (Smith-Hurd 1969); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.32.090(13) (1966).
368. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-80 (West 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 718.112(2)(a) (West Supp. 1978); HAw. REv. STAT. § 514A-82(1) (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE
§ 55-79.73(b) (Supp. 1978).
369. For a discussion of the importance of flexibility in day-to-day administration, see
text accompanying notes 336-41 supra.
370. See jurisdictions cited in 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 10.02 n. 17;
see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08(B)(7) (Page Supp. 1978).
371. See I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 10.02, at 10-3. See generally
Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 170, at 930-37.
372. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.19 (Page 1970). The amendments provide that the
declaration of an expandable condominium must state whether there are any limitations on
the location of any improvements that may be made on any part of the property added to
the original development. Id § 5311.05(C)(7) (Page Supp. 1978). For nonstructural im-
provements to the additional property, the declaration must describe the improvements
that must or may be made and state whether there are any restrictions on these improve-
ments. Id. § 5311.05(CXl 1).
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injunctive relief may be brought by the owners association or by
unit owners, individually or collectively, for failure to comply.373
Section 5311.20 provides that the association may be sued in an
action relating to any of its obligations or duties, presumably in-
cluding the obligation or duty to enforce use restrictions. The re-
cent amendments broadened the scope of available judicial relief
for noncompliance with any provision of the condominium instru-
mentation. Now any interested person may bring an action for a
declaratory judgment to determine his legal relations under any of
the condominium instruments or may obtain an injunction against
one who refuses to comply or threatens not to comply with any
lawful provision of the instruments.374 The amendments also al-
low a class action suit by one or more unit owners. 375 Further, the
instruments may be enforced against the condominium property
or anyone who owns or has owned an interest in the property.376
Although there is no Ohio case law on the issue of the validity
and enforceability of use restrictions, courts in other jurisdictions
have generally held that the restrictions must not be aimed at a
specific person in the absence of reasonable justification and must
not be destructive of any vested right.3 77 Commentators analyzing
these cases have concluded that, in order to be valid and enfoicea-
ble, restrictions on use must be adopted pursuant to the proce-
dures of the enabling act, must be reasonable, and if created by
rulemaking, must comport with due process.378 These standards
should apply in Ohio either by judicial creation or legislative en-
actment. Legislation should explicitly provide that the bylaws and
rules contain specific, detailed standards. Further, all unit owners,
as members of the association, should be given the opportunity to
review and comment on any proposed administrative rules before
they become effective.3 79
Although the amendments do broaden the scope of available
judicial relief for failure to comply with use restrictions, the stat-
ute fails to provide more adequate enforcement alternatives.
While courts have generally been willing to uphold board action
373. OHIo REv. CODE AN. § 5311.19 (Page 1970).
374. Id. § 5311.23 (Page Supp. 1978).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See cases cited in Note, supra note 269, at 530 n.45; Note, Promulgation and En-
farcement of House Rules, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1132, 1135 nn.27-30 (1974).
378. See Hyatt, supra note 202, at 983-84, 1001-05; Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 170,
at 918-19, 930-37; Note, supra note 269, at 529-30.
379. Hyatt, supra note 202, at 1005.
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on the use of property,380 court enforcement is often burdensome
and slow. 38 1 Litigation may lead to animosity, factions among
unit owners, sale of units, and foreclosures.382 A legislative solu-
tion to the inadequacy of a judicial enforcement might take the
form of an informal enforcement mechanism, such as an internal
administrative hearing procedure or an arbitration board.383 Ei-
ther of these means would probably provide a more efficient reso-
lution of disputes and would promote effective condominium
administration. Judicial enforcement would properly be left only
as a last resort.
Another criticism of the amendments is that they fail to re-
quire that the written offering statement 384 set forth the use restric-
tions. The courts can cure this omission by interpreting the
required disclosure of "material circumstances or features affect-
ing the development 385 to include disclosure of use restrictions.
The amendments contemplate an indirect form of disclosure by
requiring that the written offering statement apprise prospective
purchasers of their right to review the condominium instru-
ments.3 6 The deficiency of this form of disclosure is that it does
not necessarily require disclosure of use restrictions contained in
administrative rules.
ii. Alienation Restrictions. The primary check on complete
freedom of alienation of condominium ownership interests is the
right of first refusal. The right of first refusal means that a unit
owner who desires to sell or lease his unit must give the associa-
tion the right to purchase or lease the unit on the same terms of-
fered by the prospective purchaser or lessee. It raises two
problems: (1) its possible unenforceability as a restraint on aliena-
tion and (2) its possible invalidity under the Rule Against Perpe-
380. See note 349 supra.
381. Commenting on judicial action as a means of enforcement, one writer has con-
cluded that "with high court and legal costs, and with the tortoise-like nature of the judicial
process, these sanctions are of limited value." 1 P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22,
§ 10.02, at 10-7; see Schwartz, CondominiunrvA Hybrid Castle in the Sky, 44 B.U. L. REV.
137, 146 (1964).
382. Note, supra note 377, at 1132.
383. Note, supra note 269, at 529-30.
384. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26 (Page Supp. 1978). See note 62 supra and ac-
companying text.
385. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26 (Page Supp. 1978). See note 63 supra and ac-
companying text.
386. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(J) (Page Supp. 1978).
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tuities.38 7
Many condominium enabling acts, including Ohio's, specifi-
cally state that each unit and the appurtenant interest in the com-
mon areas constitute real property for all purposes. 388 Hence a
right of first refusal might be unenforceable as a restraint on alien-
ation by analogy to the law on restraints on alienation of a fee.
389
The amendments do not resolve the question of the applicability
of the doctrine of free alienability to condominium transactions.
Since the Act provides that any restraints on alienability must
be disclosed in the written statement,390 it might be presumed that
Ohio law now implicitly recognizes the validity of alienation re-
strictions in condominium transactions as long as such restraints
are revealed to prospective unit purchasers. However, a closer ex-
amination of the Ohio approach to restraints on alienation reveals
that this presumption is improper. In Ohio not all restraints on
alienation are void per se; only those restraints on alienation
which are unreasonable or against public policy are prohibited.391
Thus the disclosure requirement cannot be presumed to validate
all properly revealed restraints. The amendments merely add the
requirement of disclosure to the test of enforceability of alienation
restraints. It is reasonable to conclude that if the legislature had
decided to exempt condominium property from the operation of
the rule, it would have done so explicitly3
92
Although the applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities to
rights of first refusal in the condominium context is somewhat un-
certain,3 9 3 a right of first refusal arguably creates an interest in
387. 1 P. RoHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 22, § 10.03[1], at 10-15.
388. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.03(A) (Page Supp. 1978). See jurisdictions cited in
1 P. RoHAN & M RESKIN, supra note 22, § 10.03[l], at 10-11 n.2.
389. See id. § 10.03[1], at 10-16 to 17.
390. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(N) (Page Supp. 1978).
391. See, ag., Raisch v. Schuster, 47 Ohio App. 2d 98, 100-01, 352 N.E.2d 657, 659
(1st Dist. 1975) (declaring an implied covenant among tenants in common not to partition
to be void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation, but expressing a willingness to en-
force such a covenant containing an express time limitation reasonably related to the pur-
poses of the restriction).
392. See 1 P. ROHAN & M. REsKiN, supra note 22, § 10.03[1], at 10-16 to 19. The
authors recommend that the reasoning of the court in Gale v. York Center Community
Coop., 211 IMI. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1961) (upholding the validity of a right of first refusal
in a cooperative arrangement) be carried over into the condominium area. The Gale court
balanced the benefits of the restraint, such as harmonious living and reduction of the risk
of financial interdependence, against the harms caused by the restraint, such as the inabil-
ity of the owner to freely convey his interest, inconvenience, and possible economic loss.
393. Rhode Island and Utah have exempted condominium property from the rule
against restraints on alienation. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36-28 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN.
19781
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realty that is subject to the Rule. The effect of applying the Rule
Against Perpetuities would limit the right of first refusal to the
period of the Rule rather than the life of the condominium. The
legislature could resolve this ambiguity, as has been done in some
states, by adopting a provision making the Rule inapplicable to
any document executed pursuant to the Act. 94 Because of the
controversy surrounding the application of the Rule, and its lim-
ited utility in the condominium context,395 such a provision would
be desirable.
c. Removal from the Statute. As a matter of internal gov-
ernance, the decision to remove a condominium from the opera-
tion of the Act is of vital importance. The general prohibition
against partition of the common areas396 is necessary to the exist-
ence of a condominium; however, under some circumstances, par-
tition and sale of the property or termination of the condominium
may become desirable. Deterioration of the surrounding neigh-
§ 57-8-28 (1974). According to the Restatement of Property, a provision that the owner of
property shall not sell it without first giving a designated person the opportunity to meet
the offer does not constitute an invalid restraint on alienation as long as it does not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(1) (1944). Florida has
adopted the Restatement approach. See Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Fla.
1975) (holding that a right of first refusal is not invalid as long as there is no absolute
restriction against sale without the permission of the second party). Massachusetts has
adopted a permissive approach, authorizing bylaws to provide for a right of first refusal, as
long as the right is not used to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, or national
origin, MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 183A, § 12(c) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1977). See I P. ROHAN
& M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 10.03[2], at 10-20 to 27 and authorities cited therein; Ross,
Condominiums and Pre-Emptive Options: The Right of First Refusal, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 585,
590-92 (1967). If a condominium unit owner's interest is regarded as a fee simple absolute,
the granting of an option to purchase in the owners association would have to be limited to
the period of the rule. Rohan and Reskin point out, however, that since it is actually the
owners association, as collective owner of the fee interest in the common area, that is re-
ceiving the preemptive option, the option may be excepted from the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities as being merely an option annexed to one owner's interest in favor of all the unit
owners. The authors also analogize to a leasehold interest exception to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. They conclude that the right of first refusal granted to all the owners is differ-
ent from such a right in gross and should be upheld as socially desirable.
394. Eg., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36-28 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-28 (1974). See
jurisdictions cited in 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 10.03[21, at 10-22 n.26.
395. See 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 10.03(2), at 10-20 to 22.1. The
authors point out that measuring the option to purchase in the association by the period of
the Rule is ineffective since the duration should be the life of the condominium. An alter-
native to the Rhode Island and Utah approach would be to set an arbitrary time limit in
reference to the life of the condominium that would not exceed the period of the Rule. As
a matter of policy, the authors argue, the Rule should not be applied to commercial trans-
actions with reasonable objectives.
396. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.04(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
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borhood, obsolescence, condemnation, or total or partial destruc-
tion of the condominium property are typical circumstances. 397
Protection should be provided, however, to those owners who
wish to continue the condominium398 and to creditors who have
liens on the condominium property.
Section 5311.17, addressing removal and partition of the con-
dominium property,399 was unchanged by the recent amendments.
Unless otherwise provided by the declaration, property may be
removed from the operation of the Act by the unanimous vote of
all unit owners.4 °0 Liens and encumbrances on all or any part of
the property, except taxes and assessments not yet due, must first
be paid, released, or discharged." 1 A certificate, signed by the
chief officer of the board of managers of the association and certi-
fying that all liens and encumbrances on the common areas have
been satisfied, must be filed with the county auditor and re-
corded.4 2 Each unit owner must certify the same as to his indi-
vidual unit." 3 Upon removal, the entire property is owned in
common by the unit owners. Each unit owner's undivided interest
in the property is the percentage of interest in the common areas
owned prior to termination.4°4
The present provisions for voluntary removal could' be
amended to provide flexibility for the majority as well as protec-
tion for the minority. First, Ohio should require a less than unan-
imous vote for termination and removal, absent a provision in the
declaration specifying otherwise, because unanimity among the
397. See Kerr, Condominium--Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 43
(1963).
398. Id. But see I P. ROHAN & M. RESK!N, supra note 22, § 8.02[2], at 8-10 to 11.
("There may be sound reasons why a small but obstinate minority should not be able to
defeat the desires of a majority.").
399. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.17 (Page 1970).
400. The opening language of § 5311.17(A) is ambiguous. It is unclear whether the
phrase "[u]nless otherwise provided by the declaration" refers to the unanimous vote or the
ability to elect to remove the property from the chapter. Some support for the proposition
that a declaration in Ohio may provide for removal of property by less than a unanimous
vote may be had by reference to Florida law. The termination provision of the original
Florida condominium enabling act was interpreted to authorize less than unanimous ap-
proval for removal. McCaughan, The Florida Condominium Act Applied, 17 U. FLA. L.
REv. 1, 45 (1964). The language of the termination provision of the amended Florida
statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.117 (West Supp. 1978), presents the same ambiguity as the
language of the Ohio Act; however, no authority has interpreted the change in language as
substantive.
401. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.17(A) (Page 1970).
402. Id. § 5311.17(A), .17(B).
403. Id. § 5311.17(A).
404. Id. §5311.17(C).
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unit owners is nearly impossible. For example, Hawaii provides
protection to all owners by requiring approval by at least eighty
percent both of the total number of owners and of the common
interests.40 5 Georgia requires only a four-fifths vote.40 6 Second,
Ohio should allow lienors' consent to the removal rather than re-
quire discharge of the liens. 40 7 Upon consent, liens could be
transferred, with original priority, to the undivided share in the
property attributable to the unit originally encumbered by that
lien."° Third, Ohio should authorize the removal of part of the
condominium property, as is permitted in some states,4 9 rather
than require the removal of all or none.410
The present Act makes only incomplete provision for involun-
tary removal. Section 5311.14 deals with repair of damaged con-
dominium property and the possibility of sale after a decision not
to make needed repairs.41 Unless the declaration provides other-
wise, if all or any part of the common areas is damaged or de-
stroyed, the unit owners, by seventy-five percent of the voting
interests, 412 may elect not to repair or restore such common areas.
If such an election is made, any unit owner may bring an action
for sale of the whole property, as upon partition. The net pro-
ceeds from the sale of the property and from any insurance or
indemnity will be considered one fund and will be distributed to
all the owners in proportion to each owner's percentage of interest
in the common areas. Before an owner is entitled to receive pro-
ceeds, all liens and encumberances on his unit must be paid, re-
leased, or discharged.413
Two changes would make the current provision more com-
plete. First, a more expedient procedure would permit the same
or some greater percentage to authorize a sale directly without in-
405. HAw. REv. CODE § 514A-21(a)(1) (Supp. 1977).
406. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1630e(a) (1978). Section 85-1630e(b) provides that the dec-
laration may specify a smaller minimum if no unit is used for exclusively residential pur-
poses.
407. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.117(1) (West Supp. 1978).
408. Id. § 718.117(2).
409. Eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1631e (1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-21(b) (Supp.
1977); VA. CODE § 55-79.64 (Supp. 1978).
410. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.17 (Page 1970). Some states provide that the re-
moval of property from the operation of the Act is not a bar to resubmission. Eg., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 718.117(3) (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-22 (Supp. 1977).
These provisions are apparently superfluous.
411. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.14(B) (Page 1970).
412. The declaration may, however, require a greater percentage of the voting power to
elect not to repair or restore the damaged common areas. Id.
413. Id.
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volving a judicial proceeding. The statute might further authorize
equitable relief where property is damaged or destroyed, and
there has been no repair or any agreement to repair within a rea-
sonable time.4" 4 This would protect owners holding only a minor-
ity interest from excessive delay in the repair or sale of property.
Second, the statute should be amended to include procedures for
eminent domain and condemnation. There are several issues
which should be resolved explicitly, such as the allocation of
awards and damages, the reapportionment of percentage interests,
the rebuilding, relocation, and restoration of improvements, the
termination of the condominium, and the authority of the associa-
tion to negotiate for unit owners. These issues could be dealt with
either by statute,415 in the declaration,4 6 or both.4 17
B. Liability of Unit Owners
In addition to liability to the association for unpaid assess-
ments or for breach of the condominium instruments, individual
unit owners may also be subject to liability on claims of third par-
ties. Of particular interest are the claims of those who have been
injured by a tort committed on the common areas and the claims
of mechanics and materialmen for work performed on the com-
mon areas. The allocation of liability for these claims presents
problems which are unique to condominium ownership.
1. Tort Liability
In Ohio, the unit owners association is similar to an unincor-
porated association.41 8 The rule at common law was that an unin-
corporated association could not be sued by third parties or by
members of the association.4 1 9 The courts reasoned that the asso-
ciation had no separate legal existence with respect to third per-
sons, and because the negligence of the association was imputed to
all members, no member could recover from the association since
to do so would give rise to the theoretical anomaly of a member
suing himself. The common law rule that an unincorporated asso-
414. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.118 (West Supp. 1978).
415. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 55-79.44 (Supp. 1978).
416. See, eg., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.830(1)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1977).
417. See, eg., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-112 (Supp. 1977) (dealing with the
issues absent any provision in the declaration). See also Comment, supra note 20, at
284-85.
418. See note 351 supra.
419. See Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933); Paddock Hodge Co.
v. Grain Dealers' Nat'l Ass'n, 18 Ohio App. 66 (6th Dist. 1921).
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ciation has no legal status no longer exists in Ohio.42 0 The Ohio
Condominium Act specifically provides that, in an action relating
to the common areas or to any right or duty of the unit owners
association, the association may be sued as a separate legal en-
tity.42' Nevertheless, members may still be liable if a plaintiff
elects to proceed against them individually.422 Further, the mem-
bers can be held jointly and severally liable for the tortious con-
duct of the association's servants and for injuries sustained in the
common areas.423 The negligence of other owners using the com-
mon areas may be imputed to other members based upon their
common ownership of the areas.4 Today the imputation of tort
liability to all members of the association will probably not pre-
clude suit against a condominium association by a member.425
These remedies are cumulative; thus the individual owner may
still be sued by a fellow member of the association.426 Hence, a
unit owner is potentially liable for a judgment in a suit against the
association by either a third person or another owner.
A balance must be struck between the interests of the injured
party and those of the unit owners, so that the former is not de-
prived of a remedy and the latter is not subjected to unlimited
liability. An individual owner may be sued for the entire amount
of the plaintiff's damages and thus forced to proceed against his
fellow owners for contribution.427 Even if a plaintiff sues the asso-
420. See 9 AKRON L. REv. 602 (1976).
421. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.20 (Page 1970).
422. Cf. Miazga v. International Union, 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 205 N.E.2d 884 (1965);
Marsh v. General Grievance, I Ohio St. 2d 165, 205 N.E.2d 571 (1965); Lyons v. American
Legion Post No. 650 Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961) (historical devel-
opment of separateness of actions).
423. Note, supra note 351, at 327.
424. Lawrence, Tort Liability of a Condominium Unit Owner, 2 REAL EsT. L.J. 789, 797
(1974). Nonculpable defendants can, however, argue for the joinder of the unit owner at
fault, under OHIO R. Civ. P. 19 or 19.1.
425. See White v. Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971) (members of a
condominium unit owners association could bring an action against the association). See
also Tanner v. Legal Order of Moose, 44 Ohio St. 2d 49, 337 N.E.2d 625 (1975) (an unin-
corporated association may be sued by one of its members for negligence); Miazga v. Inter-
national Union, 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 250 N.E.2d 884 (1965) (a union could be sued by one of
its members).
426. See note 422 supra.
427. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31-.32 (Page Supp. 1977) (allowing for the
contribution among joint or several tortfeasors and thus abrogating the common law rule
denying enforcement of contribution among tortfeasors). See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Gough, 146 Ohio St. 305, 65 N.E.2d 858 (1946); Davis v. Gelhaus, 44 Ohio St. 69, 4 N.E.
593 (1886).
It has been suggested that state condominium statutes require mandatory contribution
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ciation as an entity and the resultant judgment is treated as a com-
mon expense, those owners who had previously paid their aliquot
share may be reassessed for the shares of those who did not.42
The 1963 Condominium Act did little to limit individual liability,
and the recent amendments do not provide increased protec-
tion.429
The Ohio Act protects unit owners against unlimited tort lia-
bility by requiring the board of managers to purchase liability in-
surance for injury or damage relating to the common areas.43°
Two weaknesses in this approach can be identified. First, there is
no minimum amount requirement with respect to tort coverage.
Second, the provision allows the declaration or bylaws to relieve
the board of managers of the statute's requirements. Although the
optional nature of the insurance provision may be helpful in
avoiding duplication of insurance coverage by the board and indi-
vidual unit owners, it is questionable whether this discretion fur-
thers the objective of unit owner protection.
A preferable approach to the problem of unlimited owner lia-
bility would entail strengthening Ohio's insurance provision and
adding protection against unlimited liability.43' First, section
5311.16 should include a minimum coverage requirement for'tort
liability and pro rata liability for judgments in excess of insurance
coverage. Each owner's pro rata share would be based on the
same percentage as his interest in the common areas. This ap-
from other unit owners if less than all are sued, unless the person sued was alone personally
responsible for the tort. I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 10A.05[2][a], at
10A-15.
428. Id. § 10A.03[3][dl.
429. Section 5311.13 requires that any lien arising on two or more units be borne pro-
portionately. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.13 (Page Supp. 1978). It is unclear whether this
provision applies to judgment liens resulting from the imposition of tort liability since most
of the section addresses mechanic's and materialsman's liens. Note, supra note 269, at 533.
If this section is intended to apply to torts, a more precise approach would be appropriate.
430. Section 5311.16 provides:
Unless otherwise provided by the declaration or bylaws, the board of manag-
ers shall insure all unit owners, their tenants, and all persons lawfully in posses-
sion or control of any part of the condominium property for such amount as it
determines against liability for personal injury or property damage arising from
or relating to the common areas and facilities and shall also obtain for the benefit
of all unit owners fire and extended coverage insurance on all buildings and struc-
tures of the condominium property in an amount not less than eighty per cent of
the fair value thereof. The cost of such insurance shall be a common expense.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.16 (Page 1970).
431. One state exempts unit owners from personal liability for damages caused by the
association or accrued in connection with the common areas. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 89-9-29(B) (1972). Incorporation of the owners association also will limit personal liabil-
ity. Note, supra note 269, at 534; Note, supra note 351, at 327, 338.
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proach has been adopted in Florida, and the maximum amount of
an owner's pro rata share is further limited to the value of his
unit.43z Second, section 5311.20 should be amended to permit
only suits against the owners association. Any resulting judgment
in excess of insurance coverage should be divided among unit
owners as a common expense.433 Each owner should be dis-
charged from liability upon payment of his share, which would
prevent the reassessment of any unpaid portion of a judgment to
those who have already paid.4 4
2. Mechanic's and Materialman's Liens
The second major topic of discussion in the area of unit owner
liability involves mechanic's and materialman's liens for work
performed on the condominium property. Since condominium
projects are usually large scale and many workmen contribute la-
bor and materials, the problems associated with such liens are
troublesome. The concept of common ownership, the prohibition
against partition of the common elements, and the nonseverability
of common areas and units further complicate the question of the
application of mechanic's and materialman's liens.
Section 5311.12 of the 1963 Act, unamended by the recent leg-
islation, prohibits conveyance of any unit until all liens and en-
cumbrances, except taxes and assessments of political
subdivisions, have been paid or satisfied.435 The provision appar-
ently requires that all mortgage obligations and liens must be paid
or satisfied or released by the time of the first conveyance of a unit
since presumably the section covers the developer as owner of the
property.436 The amendments do fill a major technical gap in the
432. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.119(2) (West Supp. 1978). In addition, if the association is
subjected to liability in excess of insurance coverage, it must give notice within a reason-
able time to the owners, who then have the right to intervene and defend. Id. § 718.119(3).
433. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.32.240 (1966). White v. Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d
824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971), left open the question of what property of the unit owners
can be reached if the association is sued. See also Onlo REv. CODE ANN. § 1745.02 (Page
1978), which provides that a money judgment against an unincorporated association will
not be enforceable against the property of an individual member.
434. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.897(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1977). When the plaintiff
is another unit owner, it has been suggested that state statutes limit recovery to the amount
of insurance coverage. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, 10A.05[2][b], at 10A-16.
435. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.12 (Page 1970).
436. See id. § 5311.02 requiring the owner of the property to submit it to chapter 5311.
The FHA Model Act provides that at the time of the first conveyance of each unit every
lien affecting such unit must be satisfied. FHA MODEL AcT, supra note 276, § 14. This
approach might present problems for the contractor because construction costs may be
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1963 Act by providing protection against liens for work performed
before submission of the property to the Act but not recorded un-
til after submission or unit conveyance. When a lien for work or
materials arises against property which later becomes condomin-
ium property, after the declaration is filed the lien is enforceable
only against units (1) owned by the declarant, (2) conveyed by the
declarant to someone other than a bona fide purchaser, or (3) con-
veyed by the declarant to a bona fide purchaser whose deed is
recorded after the affidavit of the mechanic's lien.437 It is further
provided that a foreclosure of enforceable liens will not of itself
terminate the condominium.433
Section 5311.13 provides that a mechanic or materialman may
be entitled to a lien on an owner's interest for work performed on
or material furnished to a unit, even though the owner did not
consent, if the work was authorized by the board of managers or
necessary to protect public safety or prevent damage to another
part of the condominium.4 39 Liens arising from work authorized
by the board of managers and performed on the common areas
will apply against the interests of all owners."n If a lien affects the
interest of more than one unit, the obligation is borne by,pach
owner in the ratio that his percentage of interest in the common
areas bears to the total percentage of interest in the common areas
of all affected units." A unit may be discharged from the lien by
payment of the proportionate amount to the lienor.442 Thus, a
difficult to apportion among individual units. Comment, supra note 198, at 993-99. It
may be difficult to identify exactly who worked on each individual unit.
437. Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.13(E), .13(F) (Page Supp. 1978). The following
example illustrates the operation of these amendments:
Therefore, if a lien arose against 100 acres and thereafter a declarant submit-
ted a declaration of condominium as to one acre with ten units thereon and sold
five of the units to purchasers in good faith for value, three of whom recorded
their deeds before the affidavit of mechanic's lien was filed for record, once the
affidavit of mechanic's lien was fied, under the bill's provisions the lien would
attach to the 99 acres that were not submitted as condominium property, the five
unsold units of the declarant and their appurtenant interests in the common areas
and facilities, and the two units and their appurtenant interests that were recorded
after the affidavit of mechanic's lien was recorded.
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 112, at 13.
438. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.13(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
439. Id. §5311.13(B).
440. Id. §5311.13(C).
441. Id. § 5311.13(D). This approach, however, may prove to be unfair if the work was
principally for the benefit of a particular owner or owners. Gregory, The California Condo-
minium Bill, 14 HASTINGS L. 189, 206 n.37 (1963). The statute also could have authorized
the parties to contract otherwise by enumerating appropriate percentages in the declara-
tion. Id. at 441 n.37.
442. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.13(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
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unit owner cannot be reassessed for the unpaid shares of other
owners. However, it has been suggested that a unit owner, as a
member of the association, may still be personally liable for the
entire amount of the debt, even though his fair share of expenses
has been paid." 3 The statute should prevent reassessment of own-
ers who have paid their share of the amounts due, as one state
presently provides.'" Further, the statute could be simplified pro-
cedurally by substituting a single lien filed against the association
for work performed on the common areas in lieu of liens against
the individual units.445
IV. RECOGNITION OF PROGRESSIVE FORMS OF CONDOMINIUMS
A. Expandable Condominiums
The amendments specifically sanction the development of ex-
pandable condominiums.446 Land and improvements may be ad-
ded to the condominium property by the filing of an amendment
to the declaration executed by the developer and all the owners
and lessees of the additional land. The amendment must contain
the information, drawings, and plans required initially of all con-
dominiums, along with a reallocation of the percentages of inter-
est in the common areas appertaining to each unit. The execution
and recording is considered an effective amendment to the decla-
ration and does not require unanimous approval of the unit own-
ers. 447
The expandable condominium has many advantages for a de-
veloper. It gives him flexibility to determine the total number of
units to construct, their design, the time period over which con-
struction can be completed, and the common facilities to be in-
443. Berger, supra note 296, at 1023; Theriot, supra note 231, at 1223-24.
444. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-115(6) (Supp. 1977). The unit owners associa-
tion could also exercise its common-expense lien right against the delinquent owners, see
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.18(A) (Page Supp. 1978), in order to reimburse the owners
who overpaid. Theriot, supra note 231, at 1224.
445. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131(B) (West Supp. 1978).
446. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.01(R), .03(C) (Page Supp. 1978). For a more com-
prehensive treatment of phase development under the original Ohio Condominium Act
and the recent amendments, see Note, Expanding Condominiums in Ohio, 29 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 228 (1978). See also Joliet, The Expandable Condominiur:A Technical.4naysis, 9
A.B.A. L. NOTES 19, 22 (1972); Rosenstein, Inadequacies of Current Condominium Legirla-
tion-4 Critical Look at the Pennsylvania Unit Property.4ct, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 655, 663 (1974);
Theriot, supra note 231, at 1218-19; Comment, supra note 20, at 288. The amendments
also allow for the division and contraction of units in a nonresidential development. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.03(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
447. Id. § 5311.051.
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cluded.44 The developer can test the market in the first phase and
then alter the price, design, or size of the units in the next
phase.449 He even may decide to discontinue construction if the
initial phase of the project is unsuccessful. The developer may
also utilize his experience with initial phases to determine his fu-
ture marketing and operating plans.450 Expandable developments
are especially advantageous for larger projects. Since the devel-
oper can build a small number of units initially, his capital invest-
ment is smaller. Thus his risk is minimized, and he can spread
construction costs over a number of years.451  The developer's
cash flow is improved since the profits from the first stage may be
used to finance subsequent phases.
452
While the expandable condominium may be advantageous to
developers, it can present problems to unit owners. Although the
owners may have to contribute less for common area expenses as
more owners are added, if more common facilities are not built,
the original common areas may become overcrowded.453 If the
developer builds fewer units than originally projected, initial unit
purchasers may be responsible for a greater share of expenses than
anticipated.454 If additional common areas are included in subse-
quent phases, original owners may face increased common ex-
penses. The addition of units alters an owner's percentage interest
in proceeds from sale or condemnation of property since they are
determined by the percentage interest in the common areas.455
Unit owners may also be unhappy if additions do not conform to
the original buildings in style, quality, or price.
456
The recent amendments attempt to balance the interests of de-
velopers and owners. The amendments permit a developer to add
448. Theriot, supra note 231, at 1219.
449. Merrill, Cooper, & Papell, An Overview of Calfornia Condominium Law, 6 Sw. U.
L. REv. 487, 495 (1974).
450. Note, Phasing Condominiums, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 872, 884 (1974).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 872; Comment, supra note 20, at 288. An expandable development also has
advantages for the construction lender. If money is tight and the chances of the project's
success are uncertain, the lender's risk can be reduced by phasing the project over several
stages. If the developer is financially unstable and goes bankrupt after construction of the
first stage, the lender will be under no obligation to furnish financing for the uncommenced
stages. Id.
453. Note, supra note 450, at 884; Comment, supra note 47, at 462.
454. Comment, supra note 47, at 462.
455. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.14 (Page 1970).
456. Comment, Condominiums in Virginia-The Condominium Act of 1974, 9 RICH. L.
REy. 135, 145 (1974).
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additional property 457 to the condominium development only if
the declaration contains certain prescribed disclosures, assurances,
and descriptions.458 The information required in the declaration
may inhibit the developer's flexibility because he must have a
fairly definite idea of the future development of the project before
the declaration is filed and the original units sold. However, this
limit on developer flexibility is desirable in light of the protection
it offers prospective purchasers and unit owners.
The adoption of additional disclosure requirements could en-
hance purchaser protection. The declaration should state the min-
imum 459 and maximum 460 number of units that may be built. It
457. "Additional property" is defined as "land or improvements described in the origi-
nal declaration that may be added in the future to an expandable condominium property."
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.01(Q) (Page Supp. 1978). "Expandable condominium prop-
erty" is defined as "a condominium property the original declaration of which reserves the
right to add additional property." Id. § 5311.01(R).
458. The declaration for an expandable condominium must contain:
(1) the declarant's explicit reservation of the option to expand the condominium
property;
(2) a statement of any limitations on that option, including whether the owners' con-
sent will be required and the method for ascertaining their consent;
Q) the time, within seven years of recording the declaration, when the option to
expand will expire and any other circumstances which will terminate the option before that
time; however, the developer may reserve the right to renew the option for another seven-
year period if the renewal right is exercised within six months of the expiration date and is
approved by a majority of the owners;
(4) a legal description of the additional property to which the option applies;
(5) a statement of whether all or part of the additional property must be added or
whether there are any limitations on the parts of the property that may be added;
(6) a statement of whether parts of the additional property may be added at different
times, along with any limitations on the order in which they may be added and a legal
description of their boundaries;
(7) a statement of any limitations on the location of any improvements upon any
part of the additional property;
(8) the maximum number of units in each phase or the maximum number of units
per acre;
(9) the extent to which additional units may be used for nonresidential purposes;
(10) a statement about the compatibility of additional structures with existing struc-
tures in quality, materials, and style;
(11) a description of any improvements, other than structures, to be made upon por-
tions of the additional property, along with any restrictions upon such improvements;
(12) a statement of whether the new units will be substantially identical to the old
units or limited to any particular types;
(13) a description of any right reserved by the declarant to designate common areas or
to create limited common areas in the additional property; and
(14) any drawings the declarant considers appropriate to supplement the declaration.
Id. § 5311.05(C). This list does not include all the technical information required in the
declaration when an option to expand is reserved.
459. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1124.2(A)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
460. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.05(C)(8) (Page Supp. 1978). See note 458 supra.
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should describe also any additional common elements or recrea-
tional facilities that may be constructed and should specify which
ones will be constructed if less than the projected maximum
number of units are built. 6l The declaration should reveal the
effect on governance of the association if an expansion phase is
not added.46z This additional information would give the buyer a
more complete indication of how many others may be using the
common areas and how the percentage interests and expenses may
be reallocated. Any amendment should require also that a devel-
oper notify the owners of existing units of any decision not to add
a phase as well as of any decision to commence one." It should
also address the possibility of overburdening existing common ar-
eas, perhaps by specifying that a certain amount of common area
be added with each phase 44 or by requiring the developer to post
a bond upon which to draw to complete the common areas.
465
In addition to the current disclosure provisions in the declara-
tion, the amendments require the developer to disclose in the writ-
ten offering statement the total number of units that may be added
in future expansion.466 This requirement, however, does not ex-
tend far enough. It does not apply to commercial or industrial
condominiums,467 where developers may actually be more apt to
utilize the expandable concept.4 8 Nor does it require a complete
description of the phasing 469 A more effective offering statement
would include the extent to which additional units must conform
to the quality and style of the original units, the basis for reallo-
cating the percentage interests, the projected minimum number of
units, and any requirements for additional common areas and rec-
reational facilities.
By definition, the new amendments permit units to be added to
a development but do not require additional land to be added.470
Building additional units on land that was originally part of the
common areas may, however, constitute a taking of common areas
461. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1124.2(A)(5) (West Supp. 1978).
462. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.403(2)(d), .403(2)(e)(West Supp. 1978).
463. See id. § 718.403(3).
464. See Theriot, supra note 231, at 1221.
465. See Rosenstein, supra note 446, at 663-64.
466. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.26(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
467. Id. § 5311.24(A).
468. Comment, supra note 38, at 900.
469. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.506(14) (West Supp. 1978).
470. See note 457 supra.
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rather than a reallocation of interests.4 7' In Grimes v.
Moreland,472 a common pleas court held that the erection of
fences and installation of air conditioning compressors by unit
owners in the common area constituted a taking of common prop-
erty requiring the unanimous approval of an amended declara-
tion. The court found that, even though the percentage of interest
would not be changed, it would apply to a smaller area of
ground.4 73 Under Grimes, a developer can add new units only to
land which was not previously designated as common area.
Ohio should adopt a provision that would assure greater flex-
ibility for developers yet put prospective purchasers on notice of
potential changes in the status of the common areas. The concept
of convertible land is a useful approach;47 4 it requires that prop-
erty characterized as convertible land be described in the declara-
tion before the developer is permitted to withdraw it from the
common areas.
475
Some states have statutorily authorized contractable condo-
miniums so that portions of the condominium property can be
withdrawn from the project.4 7 6 Under current Ohio law only the
project as a whole can be removed from the operation of the stat-
ute, and only at the expense of terminating the condominium.4 77
The advantage of the contractable condominium concept is that it
gives the developer added flexibility in those instances when the
project is not as successful as planned. It also helps the mortgagee
who gets the property through foreclosure since he would have the
option to continue the project or withdraw the land.478
B. Leasehold Condominiums
Although states vary in their specific definitions of leasehold
condominiums, generally the unit owner purchases an undivided
interest in a leasehold on a fee which has been submitted to the
471. The amendments do not require unanimous owner approval before the developer
reallocates the percentage interests in the common areas; execution and recording are suffi-
cient to amend the declaration. OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 5311.051 (Page Supp. 1978). See
note 508 infra.
472. 41 Ohio Misc. 69, 322 N.E.2d 699 (C.P. Franklin County 1974).
473. Id. at 74, 322 N.E.2d at 703.
474. See VA. CODE § 55-79.41(i), .61 (Supp. 1978).
475. Id. § 55-79.54(b).
476. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1631e (1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1136 (West Supp.
1978); VA. CODE §§ 55-79.41(g), .64 (Supp. 1978).
477. OHIO RaV. CODE ANN. § 5311.17 (Page 1970).
478. Comment, supra note 456, at 141.
[Vol. 29:147
CONDOMINIUM LdW REFORM
Condominium Act."79 A frequently cited advantage of the lease-
hold form of ownership is that it is less expensive than fee owner-
ship; the purchaser does not have to buy the underlying land.
This advantage may be illusory since the total rent obligation is
often equal to the amount that could have been realized by out-
right sale.480
As of 1976, the enabling legislation of two-thirds of the states,
including Ohio, provided for the creation of leasehold condomini-
ums.48' They have been marketed, however, in only a few states,
and the concept has proven useful only in Florida, Hawaii, and
California 482 for reasons which at present are largely inapplicable
to Ohio. In these jurisdictions, particularly desirable locations
such as beachfront property are a scarce commodity. Affluent
persons seeking second homes for vacation purposes are often
more concerned with location than fee simple ownership. In Ha-
waii, where leasehold condominiums are most prevalent, much of
the land is unavailable for sale.483 Because land in Ohio is not as
scarce, it is unlikely that Ohio will see an upsurge of leasehold
condominiums in the near future.
Nonetheless, the Ohio law does authorize the leasehold form
of condominium ownership. The novelty of this concept and its
infrequent use preclude the same empirical documentation of de-
veloper abuse that is available for the condominium interest in
fee. What little experience there is with leasehold condominiums
indicates that they present several additional problems. One ma-
jor problem is that a unit owner who has completely complied
with the lease provisions may be forced to forfeit his interest in the
479. IA P. RoHN & M. REsKiN, supra note 22, § 19.03, at 19-6. In the leasehold
condominium, the developer receives a ground lease from the fee owner of the land. Upon
completion of the development various arrangements may be set up. First, the developer's
ground lease from the owner of the land may be cancelled and separate leases to the units
issued. Second, the developer's ground lease remains, and he assigns his interest to the unit
owners. Third, the developer's ground lease remains, and he subleases the units--the so-
called "sandwich lease.' Under this method, the developer may receive long term profits
because he can charge unit owners ground rent which exceeds his obligation under the
master lease. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 37-38; Merrill, Cooper, & Papell, supra note 449,
at 505. Fourth, the developer and landowner may be the same person, who, after construc-
tion is completed, transfers long-term leaseholds to unitholders. Bucknall, supra note 1, at
33. Finally, the developer and fee owner may set up an arrangement to share the rent and
responsibilities. IA P. RoHAN & M. RnsKiN, supra note 22, § 19.03, at 19-7.
480. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 37-38.
481. See jurisdictions cited in id. at 35 n.22.
482. Id. at 35.
483. Id. Hawaii is unique in that "[m]uch of the land in the state is owned by large
trusts and native families who cannot or will not transfer any freehold interest." Id.
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leased premises if the developer or other unit owners become de-
linquent in their rental payments or otherwise breach a lease cove-
nant.484 Depending on the arrangements among the fee owner,
developer, and owner-lessee of the condominium, the fee owner
may be entitled to exercise a right of reentry and terminate the
entire lease.485 Even where the lessor exercises this right only
against a unit owner in default, several questions still arise-
whether the unit remains under the condominium regime and
whether the unit becomes a freehold through merger of the lease-
hold and reversionary estates upon reentry.486 Another problem is
that the landlord may dominate the unit owners through cove-
nants in the lease agreement. The unit owner-lessee must abide
by the covenants to avoid termination of the lease. The tenant,
because of the long term nature of the lease, cannot avoid the re-
strictive lease by moving elsewhere.487
Unique financial risks are associated with the leasehold condo-
minium. Initially, the prospective leasehold purchaser may have
difficulty obtaining financing because of the low priority of lease-
hold interests in financial portfolios and the dubious resale value
of a leasehold.48 8 If rent is subject to recalculation at varying in-
tervals,48 9 this can create difficulty for a lender in judging the fu-
ture capability of the applicant to afford the lease expense.
Assuming the unit owner obtains financing, the investment has
several additional risks. If a unit owner sells his unit and assigns
his leasehold interest to the purchaser, he may remain liable on
the rent obligation.49 ° As the expiration date of the lease ap-
proaches, it may be impossible to sell the remaining interest be-
cause prospective purchasers may not be able to obtain financing;
mortgagees generally will not be satisfied with a leasehold as se-
curity unless it extends significantly beyond the amortization pe-
riod of the loan.49' Moreover, the landlord may be entitled to
ownership of the improvements on the property if the lease is not
484. Id. at 45; Comment, supra note 145, at 996.
485. See note 479 supra.
486. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 45.
487. Id. at 44.
488. Id. at 41.
489. IA P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 19.05, at 19-12.
490. In Ohio, a lessee is not relieved of the obligations of his express covenants by
reason of an assignment. See City Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Swain, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 16
(10th Dist. Ct. App. 1939). The assignee, however, is the principal obligor, and the lessee
becomes a surety. See Gholson v. Savin, 137 Ohio St. 551, 31 N.E.2d 858 (1941).
491. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 42.
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actually renewed.492 Thus, although fee owners would ordinarily
maintain their property to protect their investment, leasehold
owners who do not anticipate a return on their investment may
allow their property to lapse into disrepair.4 93 Finally, because of
the novel nature of the leasehold condominium, there is little ex-
perience or law to draw upon to advise the purchaser as to the full
nature of the risks associated with this type of investment.
The 1963 Ohio Condominium Act did not specifically deal
with leasehold condominiums. It merely required that real estate
submitted to the chapter be either a fee simple estate or a ninety-
nine year leasehold renewable forever.494 The recent amendments
expand the definition of leasehold condominium and address
some of the problems inherent in this form of ownership. The
definition of leasehold condominium adopted in the amendments
contemplates various leasehold arrangements.495 A person may
own his unit in fee, have a ninety-nine year lease of the land on
which the unit is built, and have a lease in the common areas and
facilities for ninety-nine years or for a lesser period as long as the
leases expire at the same time. Alternatively, a person may enter
into a ninety-nine year lease of both the land and unit, or he may
purchase the land or unit and have a ninety-nine year lease on the
other. It is unclear, however, whether a person may be a lessee of
the land or unit for a period less than ninety-nine years, as the
section seems to require a ninety-nine year lease of only one of
them. This issue is of vital importance since membership in the
unit owners association is limited to unit owners, and a unit owner
must own either a fee or ninety-nine year lease in a unit.496
492. See, eg., Teatf v. Hewitt, I Ohio St. 511 (1853); Cincinnati Oakland Motor Co. v.
Meyer, 37 Ohio App. 90, 174 N.E. 154 (1st Dist. 1930); In re Logan's Estate, 71 Ohio L.
Abs. 391, 131 N.E.2d 454 (P. Ct. 1955).
493. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 43-44.
494. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.02 (Page 1970).
495. Section 5311.01(W) defines a leasehold condominium development as
a condominium development in which each unit owner owns a ninety-nine year
leasehold estate, renewable forever, in his unit, or in the land upon which that
unit is situated, or both, together with an individual leasehold interest in the com-
mon areas and facilities, with all such leasehold interests due to expire at the same
time.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.01(W) (Page Supp. 1978).
The main distinguishing feature between an interest in a leasehold condominium and
an ordinary apartment lease is the length of the lease and its perpetual renewability. A unit
owner who owns his unit in fee and holds an undivided interest in common areas with
other unit owners but leases the recreational facilities from the developer would not be part
of a leasehold condominium development
496. Id. §§ 5311.02, .08(C)
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The amendments' requirement that the leasehold of either the
unit or the land be for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, fol-
lows the recommendations of others who have studied leasehold
condominiums.497 A lengthy lease will permit the lease owner to
build up equity and provide a sufficient amortization period for a
loan, at least for the initial purchase.498 Under Ohio common law
a ninety-nine year lease renewable forever is considered to be sim-
ilar to a fee, and under statute it carries many of the incidents of a
fee.49 9 Presumably, resale of the interest will be a lesser problem
if buyers know the lease is of potentially infinite duration. How-
ever, several uncertainties remain. There is some question about
who is to renew the lease-the developer, the unit owners associa-
tion, a percentage of the unit owners, or each individual unit own-
er. It is also unclear whether each renewal must be for ninety-
nine years or whether other time intervals could be used. The
condominiums will be sold at different times, and thus individual
leases will expire at different times. The amendments do not spell
out the legal consequences of lease expiration, non-renewal of
particular leases, renewal for periods other than ninety-nine years,
and allocation of costs of maintenance and repair on common ar-
eas should some units no longer be part of the condominium.
The amendments require that the declaration disclose the na-
ture and terms of any rights under the lease. The declaration must
state where the ground lease and any other leases that may termi-
nate or reduce the condominium property are located and the date
of expiration of these leases. Further, the declaration must state
whether any land or improvements will be owned in fee simple by
the unit owners and whether the unit owners can remove improve-
ments upon expiration of the lease. Finally, the declaration must
state whether unit owners have a right to redeem the reversion
and must assure that the lessor shall not terminate the interest of
any unit holder not in default.5" If even part of the condominium
property is to be held in a leasehold estate, the amendments re-
497. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 46; THE LEASEHOLD CONDOMINIUM-PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS, THE REPORT OF THE ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON LEASEHOLD CONDOMINIUMS,
reprinted in IA P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, app. 19-1, at 19-22 [hereinafter
cited as ONTARIO TASK FORCE].
498. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 46.
499. See Welfare Fed'n v. Glander, 146 Ohio St. 146, 64 N.E.2d 813 (1945); Rawson v.
Brown, 104 Ohio St. 537, 136 N.E. 209 (1922). But see Taylor v. DeBus, 31 Ohio St. 468
(1877) (limiting Worthington v. Hewes & McCann, 19 Ohio St. 66 (1869)). See also OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.04 (Page 1976).
500. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.05(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
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quire the drawings to show the locations and dimensions of each
leasehold and to label them as leased, each with different letters or
numbers.5 01
Further information must be disclosed in the condominium in-
struments and in the written statement. The developer must dis-
close in the instruments that in a leasehold condominium he may
retain the same interest in the common areas and facilities as he
retains in the entire condominium development. In the written
statement the developer must provide a precise statement of the
nature of the condominium ownership interest that is being of-
fered. Presumably, this would require nothing beyond a state-
ment that it is a leasehold condominium. Given the disclosure
policy evidenced by the amendments and the vital need of the
prospective purchaser for the information that must be contained
in the declaration, it seems to be a major flaw of the amendments
that the written statement need not disclose the same information.
Certainly a prospective purchaser ought to be told that he cannot
keep the building he has paid for after the lease expires, that a
lease of some portions of the condominium property will expire in
twenty years, or that he cannot purchase the reversion. Full dis-
closure of such provisions ought to be the legal minimum.50 2
The amendments fail to clarify or resolve many of the poten-
tial issues. First, the amendments fail to deal with the merger
problem. Georgia law503 provides that there will be no merger if
the lessor acquires title to the unit. The Uniform Condominium
Act also specifically provides that there will be no merger if the
owner of the reversion obtains the leasehold interest and provides
for the reallocation of the interest in the common area upon termi-
nation of a lease.5°4 The Ohio statute should include these details
to avoid confusion. Second, the amendments place few con-
straints on the lessor's power to design the leasehold to suit his
own needs. 505 Third, a fair method of determining rights to im-
provements on leased property and compensation for removal or
501. Id. § 5311.07.
502. Id. §§ 5311.25(B), .26(B). Disclosure in the written statement should mean that
the nature of the leasehold condominium interest and all material information shall be
presented in a readable and understandable manner. See id § 5311.26(B) For a discus-
sion of disclosure, see notes 43-102 supra and accompanying text.
503. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1623e(b) (1978).
504. UNIFORM CONDOMiNiUM Acr, §§ 2-107(c),-107(d), reprintedin IA P. RoHAN &
M. REsKsN, supra note 22, § 1907, at 19-15.
505. See Bucknall, supra note 1, at 44-45; ONTARIO TASK FORCE, supra note 497, at
19-40.
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nonremoval ought to be determined. 5" Tenants' fights ought to
be governed by the bylaws of the condominium rather than by the
lease so that tenants in the same condominium property will not
be subject to varying restrictions. Finally, landowners should be
required to give the tenant first option to purchase the rever-
sion.5" 7 Provision ought to be made for rent recalculation, for
both time period and amount, so that the tenant is not subjected to
unconscionable or frequent rent increases. 50 8 Landowners should
be permitted to terminate the lease only in extreme circumstances
and should be required to give extensive notice.509
V. CONCLUSION
The increasing development of condominiums as an important
form of property has not been without problems. In response, the
Ohio legislature has moved to alleviate these difficulties through
amendments in three major areas. First, condominium consumer
protection measures have been developed which should curb de-
veloper abuse. Second, individual and collective rights and liabil-
ities of those involved in condominium properties have been
further delineated, relieving much uncertainty while judiciously
reinforcing apropriate interests of both unit owner and developer.
Finally, by recognizing expandable and leasehold condominiums,
the new legislation should promote the innovative use of these
property concepts.
As with any new legislation, there is room for criticism and
improvement. The adequacy of the recent consumer protection
amendments is a valid issue. Some may feel that a stronger posi-
tion should have been taken and that administrative enforcement
procedures should have been developed. Nevertheless, Ohio has
followed a commendably cautious course by attempting to pro-
vide adequate consumer protection through the mechanism of dis-
closure. The time may arrive when disclosure will prove to be an
inadequate prophylactic; for present purposes the creation of ad-
ministrative protection in Ohio seems unwarranted. It is notewor-
thy that even the most recent convert to the regulatory approach,
Florida, provided protection to consumers through disclosure un-
til the need for an administrative solution became compelling. In
506. ONTARIO TASK FORCE, supra note 497, at 19-40.
507. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.401(6)(b) (West Supp. 1978).
508. ONTARIO TASK FORCE, supra note 497, at 19-66.
509. Bucknall, supra note 1, at 45.
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an era of increasing skepticism of governmental intervention the
Ohio approach is consistent with both present needs and public
opinion.
As this article argues, there are several notable ambiguities
and omissions in the recent legislation. More disclosure may
prove to be necessary, especially in the area of expandable condo-
minims. A clause prohibiting unconscionable practices and re-
quiring good faith dealing may become necessary to provide some
judicial flexibility in the absence of administrative relief. Further,
there are several issues which the legislature should have ad-
dressed and which may need to be resolved in the future. Note-
worthy omissions include the failure to provide for a better
balance between an injured party's right of recovery and the pres-
ent unlimited liability of unit owners, the status of rights of first
refusal under the doctrine of free alienability, and the standard of
liability for members of the board of managers.
Past predictions of the increased popularity and use of condo-
miniums 10 have proved accurate. In response to this once novel
concept, the legislature authorized condominium ownership in
Ohio some fifteen years ago. Within a framework of rapid evolu-
tion, the General Assembly has made a sweeping but cautious re-
vision of the condominium law that strikes a needed balance
between developers and purchasers.
5 10. Comment, Condominium: 4n Introduction to the Horizontal Proertqy System, 11
DEPAUL L. Rlv. 319, 328 (1962).
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